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FRIEND OF THE COURT: AN ARRAY OF
ARGUMENTS TO URGE RECONSIDERATION OF
THE MOODY BEACH CASES AND EXPAND
PUBLIC USE RIGHTS IN MAINE’S INTERTIDAL
ZONE
Orlando E. Delogu*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the late-1980s, two cases decided by the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court (Law Court) delineated littoral upland owner property rights vis-àvis public use rights in the intertidal zone. The cases involved intertidal
land in Wells, Maine, known as “Moody Beach” and were titled Bell v.
Town of Wells.1 Hereinafter, they will be referred to as Bell I and Bell II,
respectively. Upland owner rights, to the surprise of even many upland
owners, were significantly expanded; public use rights, to the
disappointment of many, were correspondingly narrowed. The two cases
were controversial at the time. The Marine Law Institute of the
University of Maine School of Law submitted an extensive amicus brief
on behalf of the public in the Bell II case; the Bell II opinion itself was a
4-3 decision of the Law Court which contained a stinging dissenting
opinion by later Chief Justice Daniel Wathen.2 In the wake of the two
decisions, the Maine Law Review published a critical symposium issue.3
The Bell cases have produced further cases parsing out upland owner
and public use rights in the intertidal zone, and they continue to provoke

* Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; B.S.
(Economics), 1960, University of Utah; M.S. (Economics), 1963, J.D., 1966, University
of Wisconsin.
1. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986); Bell v. Town of Wells
(Bell II), 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
2. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 180.
3. Symposium, Public Access and the New England Shoreline, 42 ME. L. REV. 1
(1990).

47

48

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:1

judicial and scholarly comment.4 Most recently, two lower court cases,
both raising upland owner challenges to asserted public uses of intertidal
lands, Flaherty v. Muther5 and McGarvey v. Whittredge,6 were appealed
to the Law Court. The briefing schedules for both cases were set two
weeks apart, and concluded in August, 2010. Oral arguments in both
cases were heard in November, 2010.
Recognizing the importance of the two cases as possible vehicles for
reexamination by the Law Court of one, or both, of the Bell holdings, the
Maine Attorney General’s office, asserting a broadened view of public
use rights in the intertidal zone, sought and was granted intervenor status
in the Flaherty case, and subsequently, amicus curiae status in the
McGarvey case.
This author, a participant in the Marine Law Institute’s 1989 amicus
brief, sought and was granted amicus status in both cases. Both of the
author’s amicus briefs urged the Law Court to reexamine the Bell
holdings, and then argued for an expanded view of public use rights in
the intertidal zone.7
The two briefs were similar in many respects because the asserted
Bell I and Bell II errors, i.e. the issues and arguments presented in each
amicus brief, were similar. To avoid repetition, the second amicus brief,
Flaherty, presented only new, alternative arguments in support of an
issue already argued in the first amicus brief for McGarvey. Arguments
in the McGarvey brief were incorporated by reference in the second

4. See Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d 232 (Me. 2000) (particularly Justice
Saufley’s concurring opinion); Orlando E. Delogu, Eaton v. Town of Wells: A Critical
Comment, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 225 (2001).
5. Flaherty v. Muther, No. RE-08-098, 2009 WL 5667080 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 1,
2009).
6. McGarvey v. Whittredge, WASHSC-CV-08-42 (Me. Super. Ct., Wash. Cty., Jan.
21, 2010).
7. Brief for Orlando Delogu as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs/Third Party
Defendants/Appellees, Flaherty v. Muther, No. CUM-09-631 (Me. 2010); Brief for
Orlando Delogu as Amici Curaie Supporting Defendants/Appellees, McGarvey v.
Whittredge, No. WAS-10-83 (Me. 2010). Amicus briefs in favor of expanded public use
rights were also submitted in both cases by local counsel Adam Steinman and Neal
Weinstein on behalf of the Surfrider Foundation, Northern New England Chapter. And
finally, the Curtis Thaxter law firm submitted amicus briefs in both cases on behalf of
littoral upland property owners asserting the correctness of the Bell holdings. Sidney St.
F. Thaxter was lead counsel in the Bell cases, and is counsel on behalf of upland owners
in a pending case raising many of the same issues in controversy here, Almeder v. Town
of Kennebunkport (the Goose Rocks Beach Case), No. RE-09-111 (Me. Super. Ct. York
County, filed Oct. 23, 2009).
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amicus brief.8 Each brief also contained those arguments unique to that
case. For whatever value it may have to scholars, those in Maine, or
other states, called upon to defend public rights in intertidal lands, all of
the issues, arguments, and footnotes contained in the author’s two amicus
briefs are combined in this single article.
II. THE FACTS IN THE TWO CASES
A. McGarvey v. Whittredge, Amicus Brief #1
This relatively straightforward case came to trial on the basis of an
agreed-upon statement of facts said to be “undisputed” by the trial court.9
In this statement both parties implicitly acknowledge that the public has
a right to be upon the beach—that a “public easement” exists allowing
“fishing, fowling, and navigation.”10 The trial court, relying on Bell I,
accepted this proposition.11
Plaintiffs/appellants asserted that
defendants’ passage across what they referred to as “appellants’ beach”
to gain access to the ocean and then to deeper water to engage in “scuba
diving,” and also to use the beach for post-dive “socializing,” are not
permitted “easement” uses.12 Defendants/appellees, relying on reasoning
in Bell II, asserted that the term “navigation” is broad enough to
encompass “scuba diving”; they do not make a similar, or any argument
that “socializing” on the beach is a permitted “easement” use.13 The trial
court, drawing largely from Bell II reasoning, ultimately agreed with
defendants’/appellees’ argument that “navigation” includes “scuba
diving,” and thus is a permitted public use of the beach.14 The court
characterized the “socializing” as a trespass, not a permitted use, and
assessed nominal damages.15 Plaintiffs/appellants have appealed part
one of the trial court’s conclusion and order in this case to the Law
Court.16
8. This approach was taken because amicus briefs must conform to page, margin,
and font size limitations. Given the number of issues raised, all of the arguments in
support of a particular issue could not fit into a single brief—so they were divided
between the two amicus briefs, with the noted incorporations by reference.
9. McGarvey, WASHSC-CV-08-42 at 2.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 4-5.
12. Id. at 3-4.
13. Id. at 1-2.
14. Id. at 8.
15. McGarvey, WASHSC-CV-08-42 at 7-8.
16. See id.
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B. Flaherty v. Muther, Amicus Brief #2
The issues in this case17 are anything but straightforward; they have
spawned an earlier case decided by the Law Court.18 The present case
has multiple parties, interest groups not joined in the proceeding, and an
angry, more than four-year long history. At the trial court level, counsel
for Muther, a J-lot owner, laid out a detailed twenty-one page statement
of facts that recounted a long series of confrontations and settlement
efforts with respect to the use and scope of an easement providing public
access to a beach area. These disputations are between Muther, on one
hand, and members of two separate groups—other J-lot owners and a
much larger group, the Broad Cove Shore Association. Issues between
Muther and the Association were seemingly resolved in the earlier Law
Court case.19 Because the rights and duties of the two groups
antagonistic to Muther are not concentric, the current case between
Muther and the other J-lot owners has had the effect at the trial court
level of undoing some of the resolutions hammered out and sustained by
the Law Court in the earlier litigation.
Several issues in this case—whether the trial court’s disposition of
matters beyond the use and control of the access easement; whether
Muther’s interests could be fully reconciled with the interests of the two
groups they are contending with; whether the State was appropriately
granted intervenor status in this case; and, whether it fully discharged its
responsibilities as an intervenor, do not directly involve the scope of
public use rights in the intertidal zone, and accordingly were not issues
addressed in Amicus Brief #2.
Amicus Brief #2 did address what it regarded as the central strategy
of Muther. It is an exclusionary strategy aimed first at limiting the
number of people from within the two groups, noted above, who have
access to intertidal land abutting Muther’s property—the smaller the
number, the better. And secondly, relying on the Bell cases, Muther
would limit those with access to the intertidal zone to a narrowly defined
range of “fishing, fowling, and navigation” uses only. In sum, Muther, a
littoral upland owner, sought to strengthen and enlarge his property right

17. Flaherty v. Muther, No. RE-08-098, 2009 WL 5667080 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 1,
2009).
18. See Muther v. Broad Cove Shore Ass’n, 968 A.2d 539 (Me. 2009).
19. See id.
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by limiting the number of people with access to the intertidal zone, and
the activities that may be engaged in by those with access.20
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
As presented in the amicus briefs, the first issue is a threshold
question:
I. Whether the Law Court should use one, or both, of the cases
presently before it as a vehicle to reexamine its holdings in Bell I and/or
Bell II.
If the Law Court reexamines Bell I, we reach Issues II through V:
II. Whether the Bell I court erred in its determination that the
Colonial Ordinance vested all upland owners (in Massachusetts and by
extension Maine) with fee simple title to land in the intertidal zone—
leaving the public with an easement interest limited to “fishing, fowling,
and navigation.”
III. Whether the Bell I court erred in its interpretation of Shively v.
Bowlby,21 by ignoring the equal-footing doctrine, and the effect of the
doctrine in determining title to intertidal lands in Maine.
IV. Whether the Bell I court erred in concluding that Article X, § 3
of the Maine Constitution, and section 6 of the Act of Separation
between Maine and Massachusetts, incorporated the Colonial Ordinance
(as interpreted in Bell I) into the common law of Maine.

20. In the statement of facts in Amicus Brief #2, amici noted that prior to the Bell
cases there was no Maine case (from 1820 to the mid-1980s) that barred any public use of
the intertidal zone (regulated, yes—barred, none). Since the Bell cases, there have been
any number of cases pitting upland owners (who want the highest degree of exclusivity
they can achieve) against sub-groups of the public who have sought to use the intertidal
zone in one way or another. Besides this case, see Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d
232, 248 (Me. 2000); McGarvey v. Whittredge, WASHSC-CV-08-42 (Me. 2010)
(currently pending before the Law Court); and Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport (the
Goose Rocks Case), No. RE-09-111 (a pending case involving Goose Rocks Beach in
which upland owners would limit public use of intertidal land areas). There is no end in
sight to these cases.
21. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
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V. Whether the Bell I court erred in failing to treat the legislatively
adopted Submerged and Intertidal Lands Act (Submerged Lands Act)22
as an implicit assertion of title to intertidal land in Maine.
If the Law Court reexamines Bell II, we reach Issues VI through
VIII:
VI. Whether the Bell II court erred in its uncritical acceptance of the
holdings in Bell I, given the intervening U.S. Supreme Court holding in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi.23
VII. Whether the Bell II court erred in narrowly interpreting the
public uses permitted in the intertidal zone pursuant to the “public
easement” recognized in the Bell cases.
VIII. Whether the Bell II court erred in concluding that The Public
Trust in Intertidal Land Act (Intertidal Land Act),24 constituted a taking
of the upland owners’ private property, including whether the recent U.S.
Supreme Court case, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection,25 should alter the Bell II
court’s takings analysis.
If the Law Court, in deciding the cases before it, declines to
reexamine either Bell I or Bell II, we reach Issue IX:
IX. Whether the Maine Superior Court in McGarvey correctly held
that the term “navigation” allows the public to use intertidal land to gain
access to deeper water for the purpose of engaging in recreational or
commercial scuba diving.26

22. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1861-1867 (2005) (formerly enacted as ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 12 § 559 (1997)).
23. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
24. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12 §§ 571-573 (2005) (permitting the public to use intertidal
lands for recreational purposes).
25. 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2592 (2010).
26. With respect to the preparation of amicus briefs, Maine Rules of Appellate
Procedure require that a separate Table of Authorities be prepared, and that after the
Statement of Issues, a Summary of Arguments (in support of each issue) be presented.
These are omitted in this article. All of the authorities relied upon are referenced either in
the text or footnotes of this article.
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IV. ARGUMENT: ISSUE I
As presented in the amicus briefs, the first issue is a threshold
question:
Whether the Law Court should use the cases presently before it as a
vehicle to reexamine its holdings in Bell I and/or Bell II.
Though it must be recognized that stare decisis—adherence to
precedent—is the general rule, it cannot be an immutable rule, or the
mistakes of the past will be with us forever.27 In Myrick v. James, the
Law Court noted that “[p]roper respect for precedent as a source of
stability does not require that each decided case must be held inviolate
for all time.”28 More usefully, Myrick laid out a multi-factor test for
determining when it is appropriate to reconsider a Law Court holding.29
Another relatively recent Law Court case that addressed issues of
stare decisis is Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co.30 In Adams, the Law Court
recognized that “[t]he underlying rationale of the doctrine of stare decisis
is the obvious need to promote consistency and uniformity of decisions.
The doctrine has been said to serve as a brake upon legal change to be
applied in the interests of continuity.”31 The Law Court went on:
While we recognize the unquestioned need for the uniformity
and certainty the doctrine provides, we have also previously
recognized the dangers of blind application of the doctrine
merely to enshrine forever earlier decisions of this Court. When
principles fail to produce just results, this Court has found a
departure from precedent necessary to fulfill its role of reasoned
decision making . . . . The doctrine, however, is a principle of
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decision, however recent and questionable, when such
adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more
embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by

27. See Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987 (Me. 1982).
28. Id. at 998. The Myrick court’s discourse on stare decisis is worth reading in full; it
is replete with case law and scholarly support from Maine and other jurisdictions for
invoking, and/or setting aside, principles of stare decisis.
29. Id. at 1000.
30. 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982).
31. Id. at 935 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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experience. Whether the doctrine should be applied or avoided
is a decision which rests in the discretion of the court.32
Even more recently the Law Court decided Eaton v. Town of Wells.33
The dispute in Eaton was complex; it involved title issues and the scope
of public use rights on some 2,200 linear feet of intertidal land. The Bell
cases, particularly Bell II, were central to plaintiff’s arguments in Eaton,
and to the trial court’s and the Law Court’s disposition of the case.34 A
broadened range of public use rights (beyond the narrow “fishing,
fowling, and navigation” holding of Bell II) was sustained.35
But, for our purposes, Justice Saufley’s concurring opinion in the
case is more important. In a word, she would have revisited, and
overruled, Bell II, but not before carefully examining the doctrine of
stare decisis as well as the two Maine cases, Myrick and Adams, noted
above.36 The concurring opinion pointed out in footnote nine, that all
five of Myrick’s tests for determining when it is appropriate to reconsider
a Law Court holding were met.37 But this reasoning, unfortunately, was
not acquiesced to by the majority of the Eaton court. Justice Saufley’s
opinion does suggest, however, that the errors of the Bell cases will not
go away—events have proved her correct. Parenthetically, it should be
noted that all five factors of Myrick’s test for putting aside stare decisis,
for reexamining the Bell holdings, are also met in the two cases now
before the Law Court.
Beyond the reasoning in Myrick, Adams, and Eaton, perhaps the
most compelling argument for reexamination of the Bell cases is the trial
32. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Roberts’ opinion in Adams is worth a full reading.
It examines reliance factors, whether there was a long line of authority supporting the
case law sought to be reexamined, and whether the legislature has weighed in on the
issue. In Adams, these factors warranted both re-examination and reversal of prior case
law. Applying these factors to the cases now before the Law Court, we find that the
narrow reading of public rights in the intertidal zone in both Bell I and Bell II is not
supported by a long line of prior Maine case law. On the contrary, Maine case law has
continuously expanded the “navigation” prong of public use rights. The Bell holdings, in
addition to being in conflict with concepts underlying the jus publicum, are also in
conflict with legislative enactments; they are not well reasoned, not a fair balancing of
public and private rights in the foreshore, and have been criticized by courts and scholars
alike. And other than quelling the exclusionist tendencies of upland owners, no
significant reliance factors will be upset by a reexamination and modification of the Bell
holdings—which were decided relatively recently.
33. 760 A.2d 232, 232 (Me. 2000); see also Delogu, supra note 4.
34. Eaton, 760 A.2d at 244, 247-48.
35. Id. at 248.
36. Id. at 248-50 (Saufley, J. concurring).
37. Id. at 249-50.
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court opinion in Flaherty. It is a rare (and heartening) example of
thoroughness, bluntness, and eloquence, laying out the illogic and
inconsistencies of the Bell holdings. It underscores the widely perceived
view that the Bell cases, rather than simply confirming widely held views
of public and private rights in the foreshore, represented a fundamental
shift in the balancing of public and private rights in this unique intertidal
land area. Upland owners were given a windfall they could hardly have
anticipated. Public use rights in the intertidal zone, and activities
engaged in for generations, were to be narrowly construed. What Judge
Crowley’s opinion suggested was that decisions of this magnitude, given
their relatively recent date, and the controversy surrounding them, ought
at least to be reexamined by the Law Court, and if found wanting, as was
the case in Adams, modified or overturned.
Furthermore, a reexamination of the Bell cases is necessary because
of their impact on two significant enactments of the Maine State
Legislature. Bell II declared the Intertidal Land Act38 unconstitutional (a
“taking” of an upland owner’s property).39 And, barely five years after
an Opinion of the Justices40 declared the Submerged Lands Act41 to be a
useful, and a permissible, piece of legislation, Bell I, suggested that the
Act wasn’t even necessary—upland owners had fee simple title to
intertidal land all along. Bell I’s terse statement that the 1981 Opinion of
the Justices was “not binding”42 hardly explains the inconsistency
between its own reasoning and that of the Opinion of the Justices. Given
these realities, deference to a coordinate, co-equal branch of Maine State
Government would suggest that reexamination of the Bell cases is
appropriate. If this produces a reversal or modification of one, or both,
of the Bell cases, it follows that these two enactments would take on a
renewed and continuing significance.
For all of the reasons outlined above, a reexamination of one or both
of the Bell cases seems both appropriate and necessary. Either the Bell
cases will be adhered to, or reasonable new balances will be struck
between public and private interests/rights in the intertidal zone. The
Law Court should use the cases presently before it as a vehicle to
accomplish these ends.

38. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 571-573 (2005).
39. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 180 (Me. 1989).
40. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981).
41. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 559 (1995) (current version at ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, §§
1861-1867 (2009)).
42. Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 516 n.14 (Me. 1986).
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That said, it is within the prerogative of the Law Court to reexamine
only one, both, or neither, of the Bell cases. If the Law Court reexamines
Bell I and concludes that it is wrongly decided, then Bell II must almost
certainly be rejected also—the fundamental premises underlying it will
have been rejected. If the Law Court sustains, or declines to reexamine
Bell I, then Amicus Brief #1 urged as a fall-back position that Bell II be
reexamined with an eye to softening its harsh pronouncements with
respect to the public trust doctrine, and the scope of the so-called “public
easement” in the intertidal zone. Bell II’s crabbed, too literal reading of
the “public easement” needlessly, and erroneously, cuts off the
fundamental strength of the common law, i.e., its ability to evolve over
time to encompass new and/or changed conditions within a framework of
law. Bear in mind, new and/or changed conditions are often not
foreseen, or anticipated, when the letter of a law is crafted, but if the
new/changed condition is within the spirit of the law, the common law
adjusts to assimilate the new reality—that’s what gives both beauty and
vitality to the common law. Bell II, unfortunately, leaves little room for
such adjustments.
A reexamination of Bell II seems all the more appropriate when it is
remembered that the Colonial Ordinance, said to grant upland owners
title to intertidal lands and to reserve a “public easement” (a thin remnant
of the jus publicum that historically attached to intertidal land), was not
the product of any bargain; there was no sale, no consideration, no
language of conveyance.43 It was a gift—an inducement to “wharf
out,”44 and as such should be liberally construed in favor of the grantor.
The latter point was recognized by Massachusetts courts.45 In Bell II
there is no liberal construction in favor of the grantor, in favor of
reserved public rights in the intertidal zone. For this reason, if no other,
a reexamination of Bell II is warranted.
Finally, given the possibility that neither of the Bell cases will be
reexamined in the context of deciding the cases presently before the
court, Amicus Brief #1 simply urged that the Maine Superior Court’s
holding in McGarvey be affirmed.

43. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWS AND LIBERTYES CONCERNNG THE INHABITANTS
MASSACHUSETTS 35 (1648) reprinted in SCHOLARLY RESOURCES, 1 THE LAWS AND
LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1641-1691 7, 41 (1976).
44. See Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (1810).
45. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 94 (1851) (holding that when
government grants a property in the soil of the seashore to enable riparians to erect
wharves, and by the same act reserves public rights, “it seems just and reasonable to
construe such reservation much more liberally in favor of the right reserved . . .”).
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V. ARGUMENT: ISSUE II
If the Law Court reexamines Bell I, we reach Issue II:
Whether the Bell I court erred in its determination that the Colonial
Ordinance vested all upland owners (in Massachusetts and by extension
Maine) with fee simple title to land in the intertidal zone—leaving the
public with an easement interest limited to “fishing, fowling, and
navigation.”
Asserting that, at most, a “qualified title” had been conveyed by the
Colonial Ordinance—that the grant is more correctly seen as a
“license”—the amicus briefs argued that the Bell I court erred in its
determination that the Colonial Ordinance vested all upland owners with
fee simple title and left the public only with an easement interest limited
to “fishing, fowling, and navigation.”
Before there was a State of Maine, a State of Massachusetts, a
United States, a Massachusetts Bay Colony, a Colonial Ordinance—
before there was parliamentary government in England, a Magna Carta—
there was continental civil law that drew upon earlier Roman law, which
in turn drew upon the Institutes of Justinian; the latter date back to the
fifth century and drew upon so-called “natural law.” From these earliest
roots it was held that some things were incapable of private ownership.
Justinian codes said:
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea;
no man therefore is prohibited from approaching any part of the
seashore whilst he abstains from damaging farms, monuments,
edifices, etc., which are not in common as the sea is.46
The U. S. Supreme Court has expressed similar views:
By the common law, both the title and the dominion of the sea,
and of rivers and arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows,
and of all the lands below high water mark, within the
jurisdiction of the Crown of England, are in the King. Such
waters, and the lands which they cover, either at all times, or at
least when the tide is in, are incapable of ordinary and private
46. Mitchell M. Tannenbaum, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maine’s Submerged
Lands: Public Rights, State Obligation, and the Role of the Courts, 37 ME. L. REV. 105,
108 (1985) (quoting the Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1); see also id. at 107-110 (and
accompanying footnotes).
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occupation, cultivation and improvement; and their natural and
primary uses are public in nature, for highways of navigation and
commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing
by all the King’s subjects. Therefore the title . . . in such lands
. . . belongs to the King as the sovereign; and the dominion
thereof, jus publicum, is vested in him as the representative of
the nation and for the public benefit.47
At the same time, Shively recognized that the erection of wharves
benefited navigation and had induced some states to grant “rights and
privileges in the shore below high water . . . [b]ut the nature and degree
of such rights and privileges differed in the different Colonies . . . .”48
Similar views were expressed in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Illinois.49 The Court held that a grant of submerged land encompassing
essentially the entire harbor of Chicago (to a private riparian/upland
owner, the Illinois Central railroad) was either void or voidable—the
Court did not have to choose between the two.50 The Legislature had
repealed the grant.51 The Court affirmed the repeal, implicitly opting for
the “voidable” approach.52 The Court reasoned that “[i]t is the settled
law of this country that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty
over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the several States,
belong to the respective States within which they are found . . . .”53 At
another point, the Court noted:
[We have already shown] that the State holds the title to the
lands under the navigable water of Lake Michigan, within its
limits, in the same manner that [by the common law] the State
holds title to soils under tide water . . . . It is a title held in trust
for the people of the State . . . . The interest of the people in the
navigation of the waters and in commerce over them may be
improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks
and piers therein, for which purpose the State may grant parcels
of the submerged lands . . . . But that [the granting of discreet
parcels] is a very different doctrine from the one which would
sanction the abdication of the general control of the State over
lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894).
Id. at 18.
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ill. (Illinois Central), 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Id. at 460.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 435.
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of a sea or lake. Such abdication is not consistent with the
exercise of that trust which requires the government of the State
to preserve such waters for the use of the public.54
In sum, law going back 1,500 years, the common law in England
before the first colony was established, and the basic law in this country,
as seen by two different U.S. Supreme Court decisions from the late
1800s, held that land beneath tidal/navigable waters is part of a jus
publicum. It is land held by government in trust for the public.
In some states, to induce or facilitate commerce, discreet parcels of
intertidal land were granted to littoral or riparian upland owners to build
wharves, docks, etc. But title to all other intertidal lands and all public
rights in tidal/navigable waters remain part of the jus publicum, and are
held in trust by the sovereign. And finally, the seminal lesson of Illinois
Central would seem to be that if you can’t give away all of the land
underlying Chicago harbor, you surely can’t give away all of the
intertidal land adjacent to an entire state.
At least one Maine court has recognized this precise point. In the
previously noted Opinion of the Justices, finding the Submerged Lands
Act55 constitutionally permissible, the Law Court noted that “[o]f course,
legislation representing ‘a gross or egregious disregard of the public
interest’ such as occurred in the Illinois Central case, supra, would be
unconstitutional for failure to meet the reasonableness test of Maine’s
Legislative Powers Clause.”56
The Bell I court ignored almost all of the long history delineating and
balancing public and private rights in intertidal lands; it ignored
Justinian; it ignored the Shively Court’s summary of the common law,
including government’s trust duties, and the concept of jus publicum; it
ignored and does not even cite Illinois Central; and it ignored the
Opinion of the Justices of the Law Court, noted above. Instead, Bell I
asserts (contrary to Shively) that the common law of England is blurred
and uncertain as a justification for beginning its analysis with the
Colonial Ordinance.57
54. Id. at 452-453 (emphasis added). The full reasoning of the Court on these issues
is laid out on pages 450-460 of the Illinois Central opinion.
55. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 1861-1867 (2005) (formerly ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12 § 559 (1997)).
56. See Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 610 (Me. 1981). The constitutional
permissibility of Maine’s Submerged Lands Act turned on the same reasoning that moved
the Illinois Central Court—all of the state’s submerged and intertidal lands were not
being given away—only discreet (filled) parcels, and then only to serve valid public
purposes, such as commerce and navigation.
57. See Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 511-512 (Me. 1986).
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Bell I recognizes that the ordinance “may have been annulled by the
abrogation of the Colonial Charter,” but asserts nonetheless that it
“continues as a ‘usage’ that now ‘has force as our common law.’”58 Bell
I’s reasoning ends by concluding that “the owner of the upland holds title
in fee simple to the adjoining intertidal zone . . .”59—a judicial grant of
the intertidal zone, if you will—ignoring whether such a grant, resting on
nothing more than a judicially sponsored “usage,” is even remotely
possible.60
But there is more. If the common law needed to be modified or
clarified to facilitate trade, navigation or commerce, then we must
carefully examine the language of the Colonial Ordinance (the
Ordinance) itself—the means by which these ends were to be achieved.
And then an examination of relevant case law explicating the Ordinance
seems in order. The critical section of the Ordinance states:
[I]t is declared that in all creeks, coves and other places, about
and upon salt water where the Sea ebs and flows, the Proprietor
of the land adjoyning shall have proprietie to the low water mark
where the Sea doth not ebb above a hundred rods, and not more
wheresoever it ebs farther.61
Clearly this is not a deed—not a conventional grant of property. The
terms of a bargain are not spelled out; there is no language of
conveyance and no consideration. There is no language imposing, or
even hinting of, any reciprocal duty imposed on upland owners (“the
Proprietor[s] of the land adjoyning”) that would serve as a quid pro quo
for this grant—a grant that (under Bell I) is of unprecedented magnitude.
And importantly, there is no language conveying a “title,” a “fee,” a
“title in fee simple,” or a title in “fee simple absolute.” These terms (or
any variation of them) cannot be found in the Ordinance.
But
58. Id. at 513 (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 515.
60. The Law Court, albeit only in the noted Opinion of the Justices, took a contrary
view. It also stated that “[o]nly the Parliament, [the Legislature] as the public’s
representative could alienate the jus publicum.” Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d at 605.
61. There are many versions of the Ordinance with slight word, spelling and
punctuation variations. To avoid seeming self-serving, the amicus briefs used a version
cited by a strong proponent of littoral/upland owner property rights. See Sidney St. F.
Thaxter, Will Bell v. Town of Wells Be Eroded With Time? 57 ME. L. REV. 118, 122-123
(2005); see also THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWS AND LIBERTYES CONCERNNG THE
INHABITANTS OF MASSACHUSETTS 35 (1648) reprinted in SCHOLARLY RESOURCES, 1 THE
LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1641-1691 7, 41 (1976). The cited text is a
small part of a larger group of personal Liberties Common, which in turn are a small part
of the General Lawes and Libertyes of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.
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littoral/upland owners (and the Bell I court) would bootstrap the only
phrase used in the Ordinance, “shall have proprietie,” to pass a fee
simple title to all intertidal land in the entire Massachusetts Bay Colony,
and by extension to all intertidal land in what is now two states—
Massachusetts and Maine,62 subject only to a reserved public easement of
“fishing, fowling, and navigation” recognized in other (collateral)
sections of the Ordinance.63
Can these defects in the language of the Ordinance be ignored? The
amicus briefs and this article argue that they cannot. Can the result
contended for by littoral/upland owners and the Bell I court be squared
with Illinois Central? It cannot. The Illinois Central Court approvingly
cites earlier holdings that state “[t]he sovereign power itself, therefore,
cannot consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the
constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of
the waters of the State, [and ‘lands under them’] divesting all the citizens
of their common right.”64
How then should the Ordinance and the critical phrase, “shall have
proprietie,” be interpreted? The only way the broad view of public trust
duty, jus publicum, Shively, Illinois Central, the Ordinance, and the
critical phrase can be reconciled is to first see the intent of the Ordinance
(laid out best in Storer v. Freeman),65 and then see the Ordinance’s
critical phrase as a bestowal of an enlarged property right (a title in fee
simple) only on those who actually accept the inducement—those who
wharf out, fill and/or build in the intertidal zone. They alone can be said
to have acquired “title” to that portion of intertidal land so used. Those
who do not accept the inducement gain nothing, and lose nothing—the
common law with respect to adjoining intertidal land continues to apply.
This interpretation of the Ordinance and the critical phrase (“shall
have proprietie”) explains why many courts referred to the upland
owners’ rights under the Ordinance as a “qualified property.”66 An early
62. The author was aware that there is Massachusetts case law (predicated on the
same flawed reasoning) that predates and gives support to the Bell holdings. See
Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). But flawed reasoning, flawed
conclusions, the abandonment of trust duties, a relinquishment of all intertidal land in two
states on the basis of a judicially fashioned usage does not become good law merely
because it is repeated over time. Sooner or later, ill-considered holdings of the past must
be confronted and overturned.
63. Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 510 (Me. 1986).
64. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1982) (citations omitted).
65. Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (1810).
66. See Mass. v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 180, 184 (1822);
Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Mass., 393 N.E.2d 356, 360 (1979).
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Maine case, Parker v. Cutler Milldam Co., uses the phrase “a qualified
right” to describe the right conferred by the Ordinance—a right not to be
used in a manner that interrupts the rights of the public.67
Interestingly, the above stated interpretation of the Ordinance (and
its critical phrase) meshes perfectly with the reasoning in Illinois
Central. That Court, speaking of the time period between the Illinois
legislature’s grant of submerged land to the railroad and the revocation
of the grant, referred to the grantees’ interest as (at most) “a qualified fee
in the soil under the navigable waters of the harbor . . . .”68 The Court
had earlier (more accurately) characterized the property interest of the
railroad as “a mere license to the company” to prosecute (with the benefit
of title to a discreet portion of submerged harbor land) such further
improvement to commerce/the navigable character of the harbor as it
chose.69
In other words, the statutory inducement held out to the
railroad was identical to the Colonial Ordinance’s inducement to “wharf
out” described in Storer. If the inducement is acted upon by the railroad,
they acquire fee title to a portion of submerged land; if not, title remains
in State hands, part of the jus publicum.70
The Illinois Central Court’s willingness to allow this limited
alienation of trust property as long as there was no wholesale abdication
of control over the bed of the entire Chicago harbor is clear. The Court
noted that “[t]he control of the State for the purposes of the trust can
never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the
interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining.”71
Finally on this point, the amicus briefs’ interpretation of the
Ordinance meshes with, and is implicitly supported by, the previously
67. Parker v. Cutler Milldam Co., 20 Me. 353, 357 (1841).
68. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 461.
69. Id. at 460.
70. In the same vein, Shively, in the context of applying the equal-footing doctrine
to resolve a title dispute to intertidal land, noted that Oregon, and a number of other states
(four) had adopted legislation intended to facilitate commerce by the building of wharves.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1894). Courts in each of these jurisdictions had
held, as had the Oregon court: “this act is not a grant. It simply authorizes upland owners
on navigable rivers . . . to construct wharves in front of their land. It does not vest any
right until exercised. It is a license, revocable at the pleasure of the legislature until acted
upon or availed of.” Id. at 55 (state court citations omitted). The point being made is that
(in settings where the intent of state legislation is to encourage the building of wharves on
intertidal land) the amicus briefs’ interpretation of the critical language of the Ordinance
(“shall have proprietie”) is not just plausible, but widely accepted.
71. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
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noted 1981 Opinion of the Justices, sustaining the Submerged Lands
Act.72 The Bell I court dismissed this Opinion of the Justices with the
brusque observation that, “an advisory opinion . . . is not binding upon
this court.”73 True enough, but it certainly offers us (at a point in time)
the best judgment of the state’s highest court. The Opinion of the Justices
noted at the outset that, “intertidal and submerged lands are impressed
with a public trust . . . .”74 It recognized that only a legislature could
alienate trust property.75 Further, in a lengthy reference to Illinois
Central, the Opinion of the Justices noted that “[t]he prodigality of the
[original Illinois legislative grant] was obvious . . . ,” and that Maine’s
Submerged Lands Act avoided any such excess.76 As in Illinois Central,
the Opinion of the Justices sustained a legislative act that enabled a
discreet number of upland owners to obtain fee title to filled intertidal
lands, but only when valid public purposes were met.77
Summarizing this point, the logic of the Law Court’s Opinion of the
Justices and the Supreme Court’s Illinois Central seems clear—taken
together they wholly contradict/refute the holding in Bell I. If only a
legislature can alienate trust property, then a judicially sponsored
“usage” cannot. If a statute may alienate only discreet parcels of
submerged and/or intertidal land, then the remaining portion of those
submerged and/or intertidal lands (the part that has not been alienated)
remains in state hands, and is today part of Maine’s (or Illinois’s) jus
publicum.78
Beyond the arguments made to this point for rejecting
Massachusetts’ (and by extension the Bell I court’s) view that the
Ordinance granted title/ownership of all intertidal lands to littoral upland
owners, the amicus briefs urged the Law Court to consider the
scholarship and reasoning offered by Mark Cheung.79 To say that Mr.
Cheung takes issue with the grant theory of intertidal land alienation is

72. See Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981).
73. Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 516 n.14 (citations omitted).
74. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d at 607.
75. Id. at 605.
76. Id. at 609.
77. Id. at 607-608.
78. Its status is similar to the “public lots” in Maine or public domain lands in the
West; it is held (owned if you will) in trust by government on behalf of the people.
79. Mr. Cheung, a legal historian, offers a careful exposition of the people, the
customs, the competing interests extant in the colonial period (early 1600s), and the
language and actual purpose of the Colonial Ordinance. Mark Cheung, Rethinking the
History of the Seventeenth-Century Colonial Ordinance: A Reinterpretation of an Ancient
Statute, 42 ME. L. REV. 115 (1990).
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an understatement. He argues that Massachusetts got it wrong, and thus
the Bell I court (by simply acceding to Massachusetts law) got it wrong.
Cheung states:
Having reviewed the socio-economic history of the
Massachusetts colony, the traditional interpretation of the
Ordinance in Massachusetts and Maine becomes vulnerable.
The language of the Ordinance itself, the existing laws, and the
contemporary socio-political conditions favor another
construction. Under this view, the Ordinance granted to the
upland owners only a riparian right of priority [to] use [the
intertidal zone] not a right of property [in the zone]. Two factors
support this interpretation. First, the General Court that passed
the Ordinance, though competent to make such a conveyance,
gave no clear indication of any intent to convey a property right.
Second, the traditional presumption that the Ordinance was
designed to promote commercial activities is without firm
historical foundation. If such had been the intent of the colonial
government, other less drastic measures could have been
implemented to achieve the same goal.80
Cheung points out that the Ordinance phrase “shall have proprietie”
at the time had two (or more) meanings.81 In some settings it connoted a
“property” interest; in other settings, it connoted only “an appropriate
use” or “a priority” of right.82 He concludes that the latter meaning was
intended in the Ordinance because the language is a small part of a larger
body of personal/individual rights and liberties, what were referred to as
“Liberties Common.”83 It is not in that part of the General Lawes and
Libertyes dealing with the boundaries of towns and individual
properties.84
Furthermore, he points out that none of the customary words of
conveyance (well-known at the time) are used in this purported grant.85
He also points out that there was no pressing commercial need (at this
time), nor does the language suggest an intent to convey all intertidal
land.86 On the contrary, the whole compilation of the General Lawes
and Libertyes (almost twelve years in the making) was to strike a balance
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 146-147 (citations omitted).
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id.
See id. at 148-49 n.217.
See id. at 152-54.
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between public powers and private interests.87 There was a felt need to
restrain centralized government which seemed threatening to a dispersed
citizenry.88 Moreover, the government had engaged in some “wharfing
out” projects to the detriment of upland owner interests.89 Cheung
argues that the balance sought to be struck was intended to recognize that
littoral upland owners both needed and were entitled to “a priority,” a
preferred right to use this intertidal area.90 Their survival, by virtue of
their location, often depended on fishing, fowling, and/or more limited
navigational enterprises.91
Cheung buttresses his balancing thesis by pointing to the sentence in
the Ordinance (after “shall have proprietie”)—a sentence that, while
recognizing the priority of use accorded upland owners, protects larger
public interests. This balancing sentence reads, “[p]rovided that such
Proprietor shall not by this libertie have power to stop or hinder the
passage of boats or other vessels in or through any sea, creeks, or
coves.”92 In sum, the jus publicum had to be maintained.
Cheung continues his argument by pointing out that upland owners
almost certainly already had a common law right to “wharf out”; and,
more importantly, he points out, “[e]ven if the General Court had
intended to give the littoral owners a personal incentive to develop it
[intertidal land] commercially, other more feasible and less drastic means
were certainly available, short of a wholesale conveyance of the
foreshore.”93
Cheung cites any number of examples where franchises were granted
or tax incentives fashioned (a range of 1640s industrial development
mechanisms) all of which, “fall far short of annexation of the intertidal
zone to the upland estate.”94
Cheung concludes his historical analysis of the Ordinance by noting
that, after its promulgation in 1647, the few court cases that can be found
87. See id. at 151-52.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 151-54.
90. Id. at 156-57.
91. See generally id. at 151-52. In the 1600s road networks were all but non-existent;
navigation included the movement of persons and goods between coastal villages in small
boats, and the lateral passage of persons and livestock along the foreshore (via wagon, on
horseback, or on foot) as tide stages permitted.
92. See THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWS AND LIBERTYES CONCERNNG THE
INHABITANTS OF MASSACHUSETTS 35 (1648) reprinted in SCHOLARLY RESOURCES, 1 THE
LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1641-1691 7, 41 (1976); see also Cheung, supra
note 79, at n.236.
93. Cheung, supra note 79, at 153.
94. Id. at 154.
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addressing the Ordinance did not treat the upland owner as holding fee
title to intertidal land—he notes that:
In a civil case in 1664, a Massachusetts court still referred to the
high water mark as the natural monument by which to define
boundaries at the shore. In 1790, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court found it necessary to point out that the littoral
proprietors may “use” [they did not own] the flats to the low
water mark. If the Ordinance had clearly conveyed the intertidal
zone to these littoral proprietors, they would certainly have had
use of the flats without needing court authorization.95
A review of Massachusetts court cases makes clear that more than
150 years elapsed (after promulgation of the Ordinance) before
Massachusetts courts began to characterize the sparse and ambiguous
language of the Ordinance as a conveyance of fee title to intertidal land.
More than 200 years elapsed before what is regarded as the definitive
case confirming this characterization, Commonwealth v. Alger, was
decided.96 Chief Justice Shaw’s lengthy discourse seeks to quell debate
as to the meaning and effect of the Ordinance—he asserts that the
Ordinance conveyed intertidal land in fee to upland owners.97 But at the
same time he admits the paucity of cases prior to 1800.98 And he also
recognizes the great value that these intertidal lands represented to
upland owners in harbors such as Boston.99 It does not strain credulity to
see Alger as a post hoc interpretation of the Ordinance—an interpretation
that met the commercial needs of Massachusetts in the 1850s (and
continues to the present) but one not needed, not intended, and not
contemplated by the seventeenth century drafters of the General Lawes
and Liberties of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Cheung summarizes his
argument by noting that “[t]he intent behind the Ordinance remains the
central dispute in modern litigation over rights in the intertidal zone. As
this Article has demonstrated, colonial history does not support the
traditional view that the Ordinance acted as a conveyance of property.”100
The gap of more than 200 years between the 1647 Ordinance and
Alger, the fact that the Alger interpretation is clearly out of sync with
95. Id. at 155; see especially id. at nn.252, 253. A full reading of pages 146-155 of
Mr. Cheung’s article, including his extensive footnote citations, seems useful. See also
id. at 146-155 for Mr. Cheung’s discussion of the Ordinance’s application.
96. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851).
97. Id. at 79.
98. Id. at 72-73.
99. Id. at 73.
100. Cheung, supra note 79, at 156. The author shares Mr. Cheung’s view.
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English common law and early colonial law, and, as Shively points out,
does not conform with the law regarding title to intertidal land in any of
the other original states, strengthens Cheung’s argument.
Concluding the entire argument on this issue, the critical errors of
Maine law, with respect to intertidal land, are: first, that neither the
legislative branch nor the judicial branch has ever undertaken to see
Maine as a separate entity, entitled to fashion its own law with respect to
intertidal land; second, there has been no critical examination of the
actual language of the Ordinance, its real intent in a 1640s colonial
setting, the law of other nations and other states with respect to intertidal
land, or the implications of extending Alger-type reasoning to a coastal
area as vast as Maine’s. Early Maine legislatures charged with getting a
new state up and running, and fashioning a first body of laws, were far
too busy to concern themselves with these issues.101
And Maine’s courts, from Lapish v. Bangor Bank102 to Bell I, have
simply declined to examine the Ordinance in the light of Maine’s new
status—a state, separate and apart from Massachusetts.103 The Lapish
court, when invited by counsel to examine the Ordinance’s application in
Maine, responded as follows:
It has been contended by the counsel in the defence, as before
observed, that for several reasons the colonial Ordinance of 1641
does not apply in the present case, either by enactment,
construction, or adoption. The history of it is given in Storer v.
Freeman, by Parsons, C. J., and he observes, “This ordinance
was annulled with the charter, by the authority of which it was
made; but from that time to the present, an usage has prevailed,
101. Other than regulatory measures, perhaps the first intertidal land legislative action
implicating ownership interests, trust duties, policy matters, and the jus publicum were
the Submerged Lands Act, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12 § 559 (1997) (currently enacted as ME
REV. STAT. tit 12, §§ 1861-1867 (2005)), and the Intertidal Land Act, ME. REV. STAT. tit.
12 §§ 571-573 (2005). They were enacted in 1975 and 1985, respectively, and while
neither examined the broad issues of Maine’s intertidal land law, both suggested that the
Legislature saw itself (in some sense) as owner/trustee of intertidal land, a body charged
with protecting the jus publicum. The Opinion of the Justice was a response to questions
posed with respect to the Submerged Lands Act. That response could not address the
broadest questions in re Maine’s intertidal land law, but it implicitly saw the state as
owner/trustee/guardian of intertidal land, the jus publicum, and it recognized the
implications of cases such as Shively and Illinois Central in shaping a distinct body of
Maine intertidal land law.
102. 8 Me. 85 (1831).
103. See Orlando Delogu, Intellectual Indifference—Intellectual Dishonesty: the
Colonial Ordinance, the Equal Footing Doctrine, and the Maine Law Court, 42 ME. L.
REV. 43, 58 (1990).
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which has now the force of our common law.” Ever since that
decision, as well as long before, the law on this point has been
considered as perfectly at rest; and we do not feel ourselves at
liberty to discuss it as an open question.104
In the same vein, the Bell I court wrapped its arms around early1800s Massachusetts case law and, citing Lapish, declined to examine
whether and, if so, to what extent the Ordinance and Massachusetts law
ought to dictate Maine’s law with respect to intertidal land. Bell I
accepts the Lapish view that “a usage” has prevailed, characterizing
Maine’s intertidal land law as “a piece of judicial legislation.”105 No
thought is given to separation of powers, or to whether all intertidal land
in an entire state can be alienated by such a glib turn of phrase. Bell I’s
reasoning finds a hero in Chief Justice Shaw and embraces the Alger case
without considering any of the several arguments laid out above.
In sum, the Lapish and Bell I courts have simply acquiesced to the
receipt of Massachusetts intertidal land law as the law applicable in
Maine. There has never been a full, independent assessment by the Law
Court (or the Legislature) of the Ordinance, Massachusetts case law, the
equal-footing doctrine, Maine’s extensive coastal geography, changing
uses of intertidal land, or the reasoning of legal historians such as Mr.
Cheung (presented above), in an effort to finally fashion a unique body
of Maine law with respect to intertidal land.
The holding in Bell I (more firmly than in Lapish) aligns Maine’s
intertidal land law squarely with Massachusetts law. The issue before
the Law Court then, is whether Bell I was correctly decided; whether it
ignored arguments, lines of reasoning that would have allowed Maine to
carve out its own law with respect to intertidal land areas.
The amicus briefs argued that Bell I’s studied indifference to history,
relevant case law, the intent and language of the Ordinance itself, the
limits of judicial power, was error. These errors parroting past flawed
interpretation of the Ordinance led to a flawed conclusion in Bell I as to
littoral and upland owners’ property rights in Maine’s intertidal zone.
The fact that these errors, stemming from flawed reasoning (in whole, or
in part), have been handed down for some time does not make them any
less erroneous. For some time many believed the world was flat, yet that
did not make it so.
The fact that these errors find expression in the case law of a
neighboring state is beyond our control. To the extent that they find
104. Lapish, 8 Me. at 93 (emphasis added, citation omitted).
105. See Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 514 (Me. 1986).
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expression in prior Maine case law, and are encapsulated in Bell I, the
Law Court can, and the amicus briefs argued, should, take corrective
action. In short, Bell I should be overturned.106
VI. ARGUMENT: ISSUE III
If the Law Court reexamines Bell I, we reach Issue III:
Whether the Bell I court erred in its interpretation of Shively v.
Bowlby,107 by ignoring the equal-footing doctrine and the effect of the
doctrine in determining title to intertidal lands in Maine.
The amicus briefs argued that the Bell I court’s failure to address the
equal-footing doctrine was indeed reversible error. Let’s be clear, the
Bell I court had Shively v. Bowlby in front of it; it cited Shively three
times. The court’s first reference accepts Shively’s description of the
English common law pertaining to the intertidal zone, i.e., that upland
owner’s rights did not extend below high water, and further, accepts the
fact that this view “has prevailed in the United States.”108 The latter two
references underscore Shively’s point that some states had to a greater or
lesser degree authorized departures from the common law of England.109
These Bell I references to Shively are not unimportant; they both
undercut and support aspects of Bell I’s holding and final conclusions.
But they focus on minor aspects of the Shively case and make no
reference to the central issues in Shively: the meaning, the scope, and the
application of the equal-footing doctrine.110
Because the dispute in Shively involved competing claims by two
upland owners to the same intertidal land, and at the same time turned on
this doctrine, the court found it necessary to explain the doctrine. Justice

106. It is worth noting that Bell I’s views (in Massachusetts and in Maine) have always
been held with some degree of discomfort and caution—thus the repeated case law
admonition “to construe [the reserved rights] much more liberally in favor of [the
grantor],” see Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 94 (1981); and the repeated
characterization of the upland owners intertidal right as a “qualified fee,” “a qualified
property,” “a mere license” see supra notes 65-70, and accompanying text. More
recently the highest court in Massachusetts speaking of upland owner intertidal rights
noted: “this ownership always had strings attached.” See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 360 (Mass. 1979).
107. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
108. See Bell I, 510 A.2d at 511.
109. Id. at 511, 515.
110. See Delogu, supra note 103, at 53-55.
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Gray noted that the doctrine applied to new states admitted into the
Union—they were intended to have, “the same rights of sovereignty,
freedom and independence as the other States . . .”—in other words, they
were admitted “on an equal footing with the original States in all respects
whatever.”111 Speaking directly to intertidal land rights, Shively noted
that “[t]he new States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the
Constitution have the same rights as the original States in the tide waters,
and in the lands below the high water mark, within their respective
jurisdictions.”112 At another point,113 the Shively Court approvingly cited
Knight v. United States Land Association114 and Pollard v. Hagan.115
The Knight Court stated:
It is the settled rule of law in this court that absolute property in,
and dominion and sovereignty over, the soils under the tide
waters in the original States were reserved to the several States;
and that the new States since admitted have the same rights,
sovereignty, and jurisdiction in that behalf as the original States
possess within their respective borders.116
The Pollard Court stated that “[t]he right of Alabama and every
other new state to exercise all the powers of government, which belong
to and may be exercised by the original state of the union, must be
admitted, and remain unquestioned . . . .”117
With this doctrinal background in its mind’s eye, the Shively Court
turned to the dispute before it. It is important to note that Oregon
became a state in 1859. Shively’s claim had its roots in a pre-statehood
(1850) grant by the United States of public domain land that abutted the
Columbia River. Shively presumed his grant included land below high
water. He subsequently subdivided the land.118 Bowlby legally acquired
an upland parcel of the subdivided land; he subsequently acquired from
the State of Oregon adjoining land below high water (pursuant to an
1872 Act); Shively, however, claimed he had retained title to this
intertidal parcel of land.119

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See Shively, 152 U.S. at 26 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 30.
142 U.S. 161 (1891).
44 U.S. 212 (1845).
See Knight, 142 U.S. at 183.
Pollard, 44 U.S. at 224.
Shively, 152 U.S. at 9.
Id.
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The trial court and the U.S. Supreme Court were of one mind. The
United States could certainly alienate by granting title to public domain
land in territories it held, leaving Shively’s upland title secure; but
drawing on cases such as Pollard and Knight, as well as English
common law with respect to intertidal land, and the equal-footing
doctrine, they could not alienate land below high water—“they held it
only in trust for the future States that might be created out of such
territory.”120 Oregon acquired title to these tidelands in trust for the
public under the equal-footing doctrine upon becoming a state in 1859.121
The only question that remained was whether Oregon’s grant of title to a
discreet parcel of tideland to Bowlby was valid. Both courts determined
that it was.122 Bowlby had fully responded to an Oregon statute intended
to encourage “wharfing out”; he acquired title to the parcel of tideland in
question by actually filling/building and enhancing the possibilities for
marine commerce.123
The relevance of these core issues Shively (the meaning, intent, and
application of the equal-footing doctrine) to the issues before the Law
Court in Bell I seems self-evident. The failure of the Bell I court even to
mention the doctrine or consider whether the doctrine might free Maine
(a new state in 1820) of the baggage Massachusetts had created for itself
with respect to intertidal land titles is an egregious error.
Beyond the failure of the Bell I court to appreciate the central issue
in Shively, i.e., its discussion and application of the equal-footing
doctrine, the Bell I court failed to recognize that the roots of this doctrine
extend much further back in time than the Shively case itself. The
doctrine has its beginning in Article IV, of the United States
Constitution, which with respect to a variety of issues, establishes the
principal of co-equality among the several states, including new states
which may be admitted into the Union.124
The holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Martin v. Lessee of
Waddell offered early recognition of this equality as applied to rights in
intertidal land.125 In this case, claims said to originate from colonial
grants and enactments reaching back to 1664 and 1674 were in conflict
with more recent claims springing from 1824 legislation adopted by the
State of New Jersey (one of the thirteen original colonies and states).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See Knight, 142 U.S. at 183.
Shively, 152 U.S. at 51-52.
Id. at 55-58.
Id. at 9.
U.S. CONST. art. IV.
Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
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Chief Justice Taney, while expressing doubt that the jus publicum was,
or could be, alienated by royal grant, took a more direct position. 126 In
holding for those claiming under New Jersey law, Chief Justice Taney
stated:
When the Revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute
right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for
their own common use, subject only to the rights since
surrendered by the Constitution to the general government. A
grant made by their authority must therefore manifestly be tried
and determined by different principles from those which apply to
grants of the British crown . . . .127
The above citation makes two important points. First, that all of the
original states were equal in their “absolute right to all their navigable
waters and the soils under them.” And second, that early claims rooted in
British colonial grants drop away with the founding of a new nation with
thirteen co-equal states.
If we take the development of the country one step further, the
fashioning of new states beyond the original thirteen from territory of the
new nation, then we come to Pollard v. Hagan.128 In Pollard we were
dealing with facts similar to the facts in Martin—both cases involved
title disputes to intertidal land. In Pollard, one set of claimants relied on
Alabama law;129 the other set of claimants relied on Georgia law and/or
early, pre-statehood Spanish grants.130 Suffice it to say that the
disputants claiming under Alabama law prevailed.131 The Pollard Court
reasoned that just as a new nation was not bound by the law that
preceded the revolution, so the new State of Alabama, fashioned out of
territory formerly a part of Georgia, was not bound by Georgia intertidal
land law or pre-statehood Spanish grants.132
But more important for our purposes was the Pollard Court’s
articulation of the co-equality of rights between new states and original
states and the repeated references to a doctrine of equal-footing.133
126. See id. at 408-409.
127. Id. at 410.
128. 44 U.S. 212 (1845). See supra note 117, and accompanying text.
129. Id. at 214.
130. Id. at 214-16.
131. Id. at 230.
132. Id. at 225-30.
133. See, e.g., id. at 216, 222, 223. The Pollard case marks one of the first, if not the
first, use by the U.S. Supreme Court of the phrase “equal-footing” to emphasize the
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The manner in which the new states were to be admitted into the
union, according to the ordinance [Congressional Act] of 1787,
as expressed therein, is as follows: “And whenever any of the
said states shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein,
such state shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of
the United States, on an equal footing with the original states in
all respects whatever.”134
The Court went on: “[t]he object of all the parties to these contracts of
cession, was to . . . erect new states over the territory thus ceded; and . . .
they [the new states], and the original states, will be upon an equal
footing, in all respects whatever.”135 And finally:
By the preceding course of reasoning we have arrived at these
general conclusions: First, The shores of navigable waters, and
the soils under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the
United States, but were reserved to the states respectively.
Secondly, the new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and
jurisdiction over this subject as the original states.136
If one substitutes Maine and Massachusetts for Alabama and
Georgia, respectively, and if one substitutes the purported Colonial
Ordinance grant, if indeed that’s what it was, which many years later is
said to dictate Maine’s intertidal land law, for the Spanish grants in
Pollard or the British grants in Martin, then the significance of these two
cases is readily seen. Alabama and New Jersey prevailed; they were not
saddled with ancient grants and they fashioned their own intertidal land
law. Maine too, should not be saddled with ancient Ordinance grants.
Maine, albeit belatedly,137 should be permitted to fashion its own
intertidal land law.
In sum, the Martin case makes clear that after the revolution there
was a new paradigm—a new nation. This nation was prepared to protect
separateness, but at the same time the absolute equality of each state vis-a-vis every other
state within the Union. This verbalization of the concept has been used repeatedly since
Pollard, see, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), and Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Miss., 484 U.S. 469 (1988), and has been extended to other areas of law, not just the law
related to navigable waters and intertidal land. It seems firmly embedded as a doctrine in
our constitutional law jurisprudence.
134. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 222 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 230.
137. It is worth recalling that in Phillips Petroleum, the U.S. Supreme Court was not
troubled by the fact that Mississippi established its claim to intertidal land, by application
of the equal-footing doctrine, 171 years after statehood.
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the jus publicum; it clothed each of the thirteen new states with equal
authority to control their navigable waters and intertidal lands and in
each new state (as it came forward over time) a similar right to fashion
its own intertidal land law was recognized. That is what equal-footing
between the several states means. Anything less is not full equality.
Bell I’s error was not simply that it failed to address Shively’s
holding and analysis in regards to the equal-footing doctrine, but also
that it failed to cite or understand the significance of the Martin and
Pollard cases noted above—cases that early on gave meaning and scope
to the equal-footing doctrine. The amicus briefs argued that the Bell I
court’s failure to address these cases and to accord them the respect they
were due was error that the Law Court has the power to correct.
Moreover, the Phillips Petroleum case makes clear that the equalfooting doctrine has continuing vitality. Its application is not a matter of
convenience or judicial discretion; it applies, even if it has lay dormant
for almost two centuries—long settled expectations based on judicial
errors of the past, notwithstanding. Phillips Petroleum further supports
the view that Bell I should be overturned.
VII. ARGUMENT: ISSUE IV
If the Law Court reexamines Bell I, we reach Issue IV:
Whether the Bell I court erred in concluding that article X, section 3
of the Maine Constitution, and section 6 of the Act of Separation
between Maine and Massachusetts, incorporated the Colonial Ordinance
(as interpreted in Bell I) into the common law of Maine.
The amicus briefs argued that the Bell I court had indeed erred in this
respect. The Bell I court’s conclusion cannot be reached on the basis of
the two enactments noted. Let’s begin by examining the two critical
enactments themselves. Article X, section 3 of Maine’s Constitution
reads, in pertinent part: “[a]ll laws now in force in this State, and not
repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain, and be in force, until altered
or repealed by the Legislature, or shall expire by their own limitation.”138
Section 6 of the Massachusetts Act of Separation reads, in pertinent part:
That all the laws which shall be in force within said District of
Maine, upon the said fifteenth day of March next, shall remain,
and be in force, within the said proposed State, until altered or
138. ME. CONST. art. X, § 3.
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repealed by the government thereof, such parts only excepted as
may be inconsistent with the situation and condition of said new
State, or repugnant to the Constitution thereof.139
Both of these enactments contain language suggesting that not all of
Massachusetts law was to be brought forward and become a part of
Maine law. Some laws were to be “excepted” as “inconsistent with” or
“repugnant140 to . . . the situation and condition of said new State,” the
new Maine Constitution, and by extension the U.S. Constitution.141
These limitations are triggered here. Massachusetts law with respect
to intertidal lands at the time of the separation of Maine from
Massachusetts was described by state court cases, and more recently by
Bell I as follows: the Ordinance, intending to foster “wharfing out,”
broke with English common law—littoral upland owners were given fee
simple title to intertidal lands and the public was accorded an easement
allowing “fishing, fowling, and navigation.”142 Bell I also recognized
that the English common law, which did not extend upland owner’s
rights below high water, was the prevailing view in the United States in
1820. The two positions, i.e., Massachusetts intertidal land law and
English common law, which was the prevailing view with respect to
intertidal land in all of the other states, are inconsistent, contradictory,
and incompatible with one another.
Ergo, the Massachusetts law did not become a part of Maine law by
virtue of limiting provisions in both of the above enactments. After the
Act of Statehood, the Maine Legislature was the only body that had the
right to decide which of these two positions Maine would adopt.
Notwithstanding the significance of the issue, one cannot find an
enactment by the first Maine Legislature (or any subsequent legislative
body) that resolves the issue of whether the English common law with
respect to intertidal land or Massachusetts’ minority view was to be the
law in Maine.143
139. An Act Relating to the Separation of the District of Maine from Massachusetts
Proper, and forming the same into a separate and independent State, ch. 161, § 6, 1819
Mass. Laws, in LAWS OF THE STATE OF MAINE 23 (Calvin Spaulding 1822).
140. The dictionary defines “repugnant” as inconsistent, contradictory, or
incompatible. See, e.g. Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/repugnant (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
141. It should be noted that “not [being] repugnant” to the Maine Constitution, also
requires that one’s actions “not [be] repugnant” to the Constitution of the United States.
See ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, §1.
142. Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 515 (Me. 1986).
143. A reading of the History of Statutory Law in the State of Maine, indicates that the
first meeting of the first Legislature of the State of Maine was held in Portland on May
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The closest one comes is the Maine Legislature’s enactment in 1981
of the Submerged Lands Act; this legislation was sustained by the Law
Court in the 1981 Opinion of the Justices.144 Implicitly, the Act adopts
the English common law.145 The sustaining Opinion of the Justices
allows limited alienation(s) of trust property when public purposes are
served. However, the court was not prepared to sustain the wholesale
alienation of all of Maine’s intertidal land; it noted, “[o]f course
legislation representing a gross or egregious disregard of the public
interest such as occurred in the Illinois Central case would be
unconstitutional for failure to meet the reasonableness test of Maine’s
Legislative Powers Clause.”146 It follows then that an alienation of all of
a state’s intertidal land accomplished by “judicial usage,” what the Bell I
court refers to as “a piece of judicial legislation,”147 would be similarly
defective.148 Bell I’s reasoning ignores the Opinion of the Justices and
the holding in Illinois Central, and, more importantly, the express

31, 1820. HISTORY OF STATUTORY LAW IN THE STATE OF MAINE, ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
vol. 1, 5-23 (1985). Two days later, June 2, 1820, then Governor William King
addressing both houses of the Legislature urged that “serious consideration be given to
the possibility of establishing a statutory code for Maine.” Id. at 8. That
recommendation was accepted—a Board of Jurisprudence was formed. The History of
Statutory Law in the State of Maine states: “[t]he Board’s procedure was to lay before it
the laws of Massachusetts and report the acceptable provisions to the Legislature as fast
as the drafts were finished, as separate acts.” Id. at 12. By March 19, 1821, some 500
Acts were before the Legislature; 179 Acts (some revised versions of Massachusetts law,
some wholly new Acts) were adopted and signed by the Governor. Many Acts were laid
over for disposition at the next legislative session. Id. at 12, 16-17. In sum, early Maine
legislatures were diligent in fashioning a first body of statutory law for Maine—they did
not adopt Massachusetts statutes en masse. To be sure, Massachusetts statutes were the
template, but many provisions of Massachusetts law were not adopted, while still others
were amended or enlarged. The work went on for years. The History of Statutory Law in
the State of Maine does not indicate that any aspect of Massachusetts common law was
subject to legislative scrutiny, repeal, modification, or adoption. Nor does the History
indicate that Massachusetts law delineating rights in the intertidal zone, said to derive
from “judicial usage,” was ever examined. Finally, the History indicates that no
legislation addressing Maine intertidal land law was adopted.
144. See Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 597 (Me. 1981); see also supra notes
40, 55-60, 72-78, and accompanying text.
145. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d at 597.
146. Id. at 610; see also ME. CONST., art. IV, pt. III, § 1.
147. Bell I, 510 A.2d at 514.
148. See Delogu, supra note 103, at 57-58 n.73.
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language of article X, section 3,149 and separation of powers provisions in
article III of the Maine Constitution.
Moreover, neither of the two critical enactments (cited at the outset
of this argument) can preempt application of the equal-footing doctrine.
Given this reality and the fact that Massachusetts’ position with respect
to intertidal lands was conceded in the Bell I holding to be a minority
view, and that English common law is the prevailing view in the United
States, it follows that Maine as a new state, exercising its equal-footing
prerogatives, acting through the Legislature, must choose whether to
fashion a unique body of Maine law, or simply adopt Massachusetts
intertidal land law. Massachusetts law cannot simply be foisted on
Maine.
Furthermore, the Act of Separation ignores a necessary due regard
for the separateness of states vis-a-vis one another. It is certainly true
that Massachusetts, prior to 1820, had the power to create law that would
be binding in the then District of Maine. But, as convenient a
transitional mechanism as it may have seemed in 1819, Massachusetts
could not pass a law like section 6 of the Act of Separation that would
bind the soon to be created State of Maine to accept “all the laws which
shall be in force in the District of Maine” and further, direct that this
body of law “shall remain, and be in force, within [Maine] until altered
or repealed by the [Maine] Legislature.”150 Such alterations or repeal
might not take place for years, but more important, that’s not how
concepts of equality among the several states works.151
It is axiomatic that a legislative body in one state cannot by
enactment export a specific law (or a body of law), with the intention that
it take effect on a given future date, binding citizens and institutions in
another state. It’s simply not possible; states are separate, equal,
independent, sovereign bodies. One state cannot dictate the law of
another state. Upon statehood,152 Maine became a separate sovereign
state, and Massachusetts law, having no binding force or effect beyond
the borders of Massachusetts, ceased operating in Maine. The
Massachusetts Legislature never had the legal power to create the first
iteration of Maine law; that was a task that could only be performed by a
Maine legislature.
149. With respect to the making, repeal, or amendment of law, the constitutional
language speaks only of action by the “Legislature”—there is no mention of “judicial
usage” or “judicial legislation.”
150. An Act Relating to the Separation of the District of Maine from Massachusetts
Proper, and Forming the Same into a Separate and Independent State, 1822 Me. Laws 16.
151. See U.S. CONST. art. IV.
152. Maine became a state on March 15, 1820.
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Had the Massachusetts Legislature, in 1819, passed a much softer
“resolve” that merely advised the soon-to-be-created State of Maine to
adopt, as a first order of legislative business, the body of law then in
existence in the District of Maine, and had that first Maine Legislature so
acted, the transitional result sought may well have been largely achieved.
But that did not happen. Instead, the first Maine Legislature began a
long process of carefully examining (accepting, rejecting, revising)
Massachusetts statutory law. This was a valid way in which to proceed
given the fact that the Maine Legislature was then the only body with the
legal power to fashion Maine law.153
The argument that Maine’s constitutional language,154 achieves on its
own what Massachusetts’ Act of Separation could not achieve is
similarly flawed. The argument fails to take into account the limiting
phrase: “and not repugnant to this Constitution.” The Bell I court
reasoned that the alienation of all of Maine’s intertidal land grows out of
the peremptory adoption of “all” Massachusetts law in 1820.155 Leaving
aside for the moment the question of whether a Maine Legislature ever in
fact adopted “all” Massachusetts law (the amicus briefs argued that it did
not),156 this total alienation of all intertidal land in Maine is “repugnant”
to the Maine Constitution’s Legislative Powers Clause. The Law Court,
citing Illinois Central, took this position in its 1981 Opinion of the
Justices.157
Summarizing this argument: the Bell I court’s conclusion that upon
statehood in 1820, Massachusetts law (by virtue of the two critical
enactments identified in the court’s opinion) became the law of Maine, is
both legally and logically unsupportable. The court ignores the
limitations within these enactments. It ignores the logic and reasoning of
the Submerged Lands Act, and the Opinion of the Justices sustaining the
Act. It ignores the equal-footing doctrine. It fails to acknowledge that
one state may not impose its laws on another state, and that Maine’s
adoption of a Constitution (a general document laying out a
governmental structure, and the rights and duties of the people and those
who govern) does not constitute the wholesale adoption of Massachusetts
law. These errors, individually, and taken together, require that Bell I be
overturned.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See supra note 143.
See generally ME. CONST., art X, § 3.
Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 513-514 (Me. 1986).
See supra notes 140-148, and accompanying text.
See Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 609-10 (1981).
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VIII. ARGUMENT: ISSUE V
If the Law Court reexamines Bell I, we reach Issue V:
Whether the Bell I court erred in failing to treat the legislatively
adopted Submerged Lands Act158 as an implicit assertion of title to
intertidal land in Maine.
The amicus briefs argued that the Bell I court had erred in failing to
treat the legislatively adopted Submerged Lands Act as an implicit
assertion of title to intertidal land in Maine. The Bell I opinion seems
troubled by the lack of firm legislative authorization (both in
Massachusetts and in Maine) of the Ordinance as the granting instrument
of all intertidal land in the two states.159 It should have been. The court
in an earlier Maine case, Barrows v. McDermott, was similarly troubled:
It may well be that the Ordinance has no force by virtue of
positive enactment by any legislative body having jurisdiction at
the time of such enactment over what is now the county of
Piscataquis, and that its [the Ordinance’s] operation has never
been extended there by any specific act of legislation since; and
it is quite true that when under the [1692] charter of William and
Mary, [the Ordinance was] . . . re-enacted [it] . . . was never in
terms extended to the Plymouth colony or to Maine under any
legislative sanction.160
Undaunted, the Bell I court asserts in several different word
formulations that long usage, “judicial acceptance,” or what it terms “a
piece of judicial legislation,” is sufficient authority for both the grant
itself and the court’s conclusion with respect to the finality of the
alienation of intertidal lands in the two states.161 To support these views
the Bell I court takes refuge in the same reasoning that allowed the
Barrows court to extricate itself from the dilemma it saw, i.e. that there
was no legislative alienation (in either state) of all intertidal land. Both
courts reasoned as follows:
But [the Ordinance] has been so often and so fully recognized by
the courts both in this State and in Massachusetts as a familiar
158. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1861-1867 (2005) (formerly enacted as ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 12 § 559 (1997)).
159. Bell I, 510 A.2d at 511-512.
160. Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 447-448 (1882).
161. Bell I, 510 A.2d at 513-514.
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part of the common law of both, throughout their entire extent,
without regard to its source or its limited original force as a piece
of legislation for the colony of Massachusetts Bay, that we could
not but regard it as a piece of judicial legislation to do away with
any part of it or to fail to give it its due force throughout the
State until it shall have been changed by the proper law making
power.162
At its root, the argument offered by both courts is that judicial error,
persisted in over a long period of time, becomes law and is tantamount to
a legislative enactment. The amicus briefs urged a rejection of this
proposition, asserting that it stands the concept of truth and justice on its
head.
However, bad grammar aside, the last clause of both Barrows and
Bell I’s “judicial usage” reasoning makes an important bow to legislative
power. It suggests that “judicial usage,” or “judicial legislation,” must
give way to changes wrought by “the proper law making power.” This
can only be the legislative branch of government.163
But this seeming deference to separation of powers principles, and to
legislative powers in particular, becomes mere rhetoric given the Bell I
court’s failure to examine the relatively recently enacted Submerged
Lands Act which addressed title to filled, intertidal, and submerged
land.164 The court referred to this legislation (without discussion) only
obliquely, and then went on to brush aside as “not binding upon this
court” the Opinion of the Justices that thoroughly examined the Act and
the 1981 amendment to the Act.165 This Opinion of the Justices found
the legislation to be both necessary and appropriate as “a statute of
repose” and concluded, “[i]t is our opinion that L.D. 1594 does not
exceed the constitutional power of the Legislature.”166
One might ask why the amicus briefs suggested that the 1981
legislation only implicitly asserts Maine’s title to its intertidal lands. The
short answer is that the legislation is unequivocal in asserting the state’s
162. Id. at 514 (quoting Barrows, 73 Me. at 448) (emphasis added).
163. The amicus briefs consistently took the position that all of the intertidal land in
two states cannot be alienated to littoral upland owners merely by a “judicial usage,” “a
piece of judicial legislation.” The latter phrase seems on its face to be an oxymoron—a
violation of separation of powers principles. There must at some point be a valid
legislative enactment defining a state’s intertidal land law.
164. ME REV. STAT. ANN, tit 12, §§ 1861-1867 (2005). This legislation was originally
enacted in 1975; an important amendment releasing the state’s ownership interest in
certain parcels of filled intertidal and submerged land was adopted in 1981.
165. Bell I, 510 A.2d at 516.
166. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 606 (Me. 1981).
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title only with respect to submerged land, land that is below mean low or
100 rods from mean high (whichever is less) and extends seaward. But
this is true in all states, including Massachusetts; it is a truism not
affected by the Colonial Ordinance, it was true under English common
law, and earlier.167 The more ambiguous implicit assertion of title to
intertidal lands derives from the provision in the legislation aimed at
cleaning up uncertainties with respect to the title of upland littoral
owners who filled (often years ago) intertidal or submerged land (or
both). Specifically the legislation states: “[t]itles to properties and lands
that once were or may have been submerged or intertidal lands subject
to the State’s ownership in public trust that were filled by October 1,
1975 are declared and released to the owners of any such filled lands by
the State . . . .”168 Logically this language implicitly suggests that the
Legislature believes it has title to both filled intertidal and submerged
land (in trust for the public) that a discreet number of private owners
need and want. Undoubtedly, mortgage lenders, title insurers, municipal
taxing authorities, those who potentially would develop these parcels
also supported this legislative amendment because it clarifies the title of
these upland owners.
Beyond asserting title to these intertidal and submerged lands (albeit
the assertion is only implicit to intertidal land), the State indicated a
willingness to release its title interest to these discreet filled parcels of
land when such alienation served valid public interests.169 This
legislative intent certainly parallels Illinois’ legislative actions sustained
in Illinois Central.170 In finding Maine’s legislative amendment
appropriate, the above noted Opinion of the Justices cited Illinois
Central, and also found that any number of valid public interests were
served by this limited alienation of state property.171
The Opinion of the Justices did not comment on the mistaken
legislative assertion that the state’s title to submerged land derived from
the Colonial Ordinance. It took no issue with the implicit legislative
assertion of title to intertidal lands, but noted that only the Parliament or
the Legislature, as the people’s representative, could alienate the jus
167. The statement in the legislation, tit. 12, § 1865(1), that the ownership of
submerged lands and the public trust imposed on these lands derives from the Colonial
Ordinance is factually incorrect. The Ordinance only purported to affect lands between
mean high and mean low up to 100 rods. Submerged land begins at mean low or 100
rods from mean high (whichever is less) and extends seaward.
168. See tit. 12, § 1861(3) (emphasis added).
169. See Cheung, supra note 79, at 126.
170. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387 (1982).
171. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 609 (Me. 1981).
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publicum.172 And, importantly, it pointedly noted that if the Legislature
had sought to alienate all or most of the state’s intertidal trust property,
as the original Illinois Central grant did, that such action would violate
the Legislative Powers Clause of the Maine Constitution.173
Parenthetically, one wonders how the Justices would have handled the
assertion that a “judicial usage” could (according to Barrows and Bell I)
accomplish this very impermissible end. This issue, quite obviously, was
not before the court when it fashioned its 1981 Opinion of the Justices.
The Submerged Lands Act is not the strongest legislative declaration
of public rights, duties, ownership of, and title to intertidal lands in
Maine that one might hope for. But this was the first time since
statehood that a Maine legislature directed its attention to any of these
issues and then only to fashion a piece of remedial legislation. Had the
1981 Legislature realized that no Maine Legislature had ever fashioned a
unique body of Maine law with respect to intertidal lands (as the equalfooting doctrine entitled it to do), a more forthright assertion of public
intertidal land rights, the scope of the jus publicum, public trust rights
and duties might well have been articulated. This is a task that still
awaits legislative attention.
In sum, the Bell I court, instead of embracing the reservations in
Barrows, chose to pay mere lip service to “the proper law making
power.”174 It could have recognized the implicit legislative assertion of
title to intertidal lands embedded in the Submerged Lands Act. It could
have embraced and built on the positive aspects of the 1981 Opinion of
the Justices interpreting this Act. The Bell I court could have raised a
series of unanswered questions that might have prompted the Legislature
to look holistically, for the first time, at Maine’s intertidal land law. The
Bell I court did none of these things.
Relying instead on the hook of “judicial usage,” “a piece of judicial
legislation,” it tied Maine’s intertidal land law to the law of
Massachusetts, a law predicated on a 350 year-old Ordinance (arguably
misinterpreted at least since Alger), a law that had little relevance at the
time of Maine’s statehood, and less relevance today.175 The Bell I court
ignored the Submerged Lands Act. It ignored a timely, relevant, and
unanimous opinion of the Law Court. These are errors that the Law
Court can now correct.

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 605.
Id. at 609.
Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 514 (Me. 1986).
Id.
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IX. ARGUMENT: ISSUE VI
If the Law Court reexamines Bell II, we reach Issue VI:
Whether the Bell II court erred in its uncritical acceptance of the
holdings in Bell I, given the intervening U.S. Supreme Court holding in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi?
The amicus briefs argued that the Bell II court’s failure to fully
address Phillips Petroleum, and the application of the equal-footing
doctrine in Maine, in particular, was reversible error.176 In the brief
period between the Law Court’s Bell I and Bell II decisions, the U.S.
Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Phillips Petroleum case.
The Bell II court acknowledges Phillips Petroleum, but, without a word
of analysis, brushes it off as a “revisionist view of history [that] comes
too late by at least 157 years.”177 Rather than drawing on Phillips
Petroleum (or its predecessor Shively) to re-examine whether Bell I
grasped the full significance of the equal-footing doctrine,178 the Bell II
court states, in what can only be described as a non-sequitur: “[t]he
Phillips Petroleum . . . decision . . . in no way contradicts the plain and
carefully explained decision in . . . Shively.”179 Of course it doesn’t.
Phillips Petroleum was not urged on the Bell II court because it
contradicts Shively.
On the contrary, the importance of Phillips Petroleum lies in the fact
that it reinforces, reinvigorates, and shows the continuing vitality of the
equal-footing doctrine, which the Bell I court ignored in its analysis of
Shively. The Bell II court failed to look at the Bell I holding critically
and failed in its own right to properly analyze the equal-footing doctrine
as it is laid out first in Shively and subsequently in Phillips Petroleum.
Consequently, the State of Maine has not yet had the benefit of the equal176. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
177. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 172 (Me. 1989). This dismissive remark would be
humorous if it were not so unfortunate. The fact that the Phillips Petroleum Court,
relying on the equal-footing doctrine, confirmed Mississippi’s title to its tidelands 171
years after Mississippi became a state, is something other than “revisionist history”—it is
doing justice, correcting long-standing error, albeit late in the day. Maine’s highest court
can, and should, do likewise.
178. Remember that Bell I totally ignored the equal-footing doctrine in its analysis of
the issues before it. See supra Issue III.
179. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 172. The Bell II court seems to suggest that the Phillips
Petroleum case must contradict Shively in order to be relevant—wrong. Exactly the
opposite is true—what is needed and found in Phillips Petroleum is a strong
reinforcement of Shively’s articulation of the equal-footing doctrine.
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footing doctrine in delineating its own intertidal land law. Turning now
to the language of Phillips Petroleum, Justice White, speaking for the
Court, begins by stating the case, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s
disposition of the case, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s disposition of the
case:
The State of Mississippi, however, claim[s] that by virtue of the
equal-footing doctrine it acquired at the time of statehood and
held in public trust all land lying under any waters influenced by
the tide, whether navigable or not . . . . The Mississippi Supreme
Court, affirming the Chancery Court with respect to the lands at
issue here, held that by virtue of becoming a State, Mississippi
acquired “fee simple title to all lands naturally subject to tidal
influence . . . . We granted certiorari to review the Mississippi
Supreme Court’s decision, and now affirm the judgment
below.180
Justice White, characterizing Shively as “‘the seminal case in
American public trust Jurisprudence,’”181 then cites the core holding of
Shively: “‘[t]he new States admitted into the Union since the adoption of
the Constitution have the same rights as the original States in the tide
waters, and in the lands under them, within their respective
jurisdictions.’”182 Justice White then cites from Knight v. United States
Land Association183 the precise passage previously cited in the Issue III
argument above.184 Justice White, immediately after his citation from
Knight continues, “[o]n many occasions, before and since, this Court has
stated or restated these words from Knight and Shively.”185 Buttressing
this statement, Justice White references ten different federal and state
court cases.186 Justice White then concludes the part of the Phillips
Petroleum opinion that deals with the equal-footing doctrine:
Consequently, we reaffirm our longstanding precedents which
hold that the States, upon entry into the Union, received
ownership of all lands under waters subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide. Under the well-established principles of our cases,
180. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 472-73 (citations and footnotes omitted).
181. Id. at 473.
182. Id. at 474. Interestingly, there is a very slight word difference (but no substantive
difference) between the actual language of Shively, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894), and Justice
White’s citation of Shively noted above.
183. Knight v. U.S. Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891).
184. See supra note 116, and accompanying text.
185. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 474.
186. Id. at 474-475, nn.2-3.
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the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court is clearly correct:
the lands at issue here are under tide waters, and therefore passed
to the State of Mississippi upon its entrance into the Union.187
Both the Shively and Phillips Petroleum Courts understood, and laid
out, the prevailing view in the United States with respect to intertidal
land rights—that the upland owner’s right/title did not extend below the
mean high tide line. At the same time, both Courts acknowledged (as
had the Illinois Central Court) that some states, Massachusetts among
them, had (in order to facilitate “wharfing out”) enlarged upland owner’s
rights in intertidal lands. Whether these enlarged rights constituted “fee
title,” a “qualified” fee, a “qualified” property, a mere license, or a
defeasible estate was for each of these states to decide.188
The Bell I and Bell II courts seem clear (more clear than
Massachusetts’ highest court) that Massachusetts law, by virtue of the
Ordinance and long acquiescence to a judicial usage, gave upland owners
fee simple title to all intertidal lands. And both Bell courts reasoned that,
because Maine was once a part of Massachusetts and grew as a state out
of Massachusetts, then Maine too, by the same Ordinance and judicial
usage, alienated its intertidal lands to littoral upland owners.189 But this
reasoning has been expressly rejected as inconsistent with the equal-

187. Id. at 476-77.
188. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s Boston Waterfront decision contains
a lengthy discussion examining alternative possibilities as to the nature of the property
right upland owners in Massachusetts have in intertidal land. Boston Waterfront Dev.
Corp. v. Mass 393 N.E.2d 356, 363-367 (Mass. 1979). Though some are adamant in their
view that the Ordinance conveyed fee title to all intertidal land in the state to upland
owners, the Boston Waterfront court at several points acknowledges that the law is less
than clear: “[p]ast decisions of this court have been inconsistent in their treatment of the
relationship between wharfing privileges and ownership of the soil under the wharf.” Id.
at 363. Its holding clearly suggests that any title held by the upland owner in this case is
defeasible: “[w]e therefore hold that the BWDC has title to its property in fee simple, but
subject to the condition subsequent that it be used for the public purpose for which it was
granted.” Id. at 367. A similar case in Vermont, Vermont v. Central Vermont Railway,
citing Boston Waterfront, involved lands underlying navigable waters in Vermont. Vt. v.
Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989). There, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded
that the land was held in trust by the state for the people. Id. at 1135. The grant, the
court explained, was for the purpose of erecting wharves and extending railroad
service—these activities for the most part no longer exist. Id. at 1129. The court held
that the railroad held title subject to a condition subsequent. Id. at 1135. The parallels to
the issues before the Law Court seem clear.
189. See Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 513 (Me. 1986); Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 171 (Me. 1989).
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footing doctrine by a long line of U.S. Supreme Court cases, e.g.,
Pollard, Knight, Shively, and now Phillips Petroleum.190
For our purposes, the Pollard case is most interesting;191 just as
Maine was formed out of Massachusetts, the State of Alabama was
formed in 1819 from territory formerly part of the State of Georgia. The
case involved a dispute over title to a parcel of intertidal land; the title
asserted by plaintiff below had its roots in early pre-statehood Spanish
grants said to have been confirmed by the United States.192 Whether the
law of Georgia would have confirmed that title had a pre-statehood title
dispute arisen with respect to the parcel was not a matter before the
Pollard Court. What was before the Court was Alabama’s contention
that it held title (in trust for the public) to all intertidal land, based on its
newly acquired statehood, and the equal-footing doctrine.193 The U.S.
Supreme Court agreed with Alabama, noting: “[w]hen Alabama was
admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, she
succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent
domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession . . . .”194 The
Pollard Court went on:
Alabama is, therefore, entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction
over all the territory within her limits, subject to the common
law, to the same extent that Georgia possessed it . . . . To
maintain any other doctrine, is to deny that Alabama has been
admitted into the union on an equal footing with the original
states . . . . When the Revolution took place, the people of each
state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the
absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under
them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since
surrendered by the Constitution. Then to Alabama belong the
190. The Pollard Court said it first and perhaps best: “new states [are] admitted into the
Union . . . on an equal-footing with the original states . . . .” Pollard v. Hogan, 44 U.S.
212, 222 (1845).
191. A careful analysis of the Pollard case as it related to Martin formed a significant
portion of the Issue III argument. The use of Pollard in this Issue VI argument focuses
on the parallel status of Georgia/Alabama on one hand, and Massachusetts/Maine on the
other. The line of reasoning and citations to Pollard in this argument are different from
those in the earlier argument but underscore the significance of the errors (of both Bell
courts) in refusing to examine Phillips Petroleum and/or Shively, which would have led
the courts to Pollard and the weight given to the equal- footing doctrine by the U. S.
Supreme Court.
192. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 219.
193. Id. at 220-21.
194. Id. at 223.

2010]

Friend of the Court

87

navigable waters, and soils under them, in controversy in this
case . . . .195
In sum, when a portion of an existing state (e.g., Georgia or
Massachusetts) is separated for the purpose of forming a new state (e.g.,
Alabama or Maine) the equal-footing doctrine holds that the law of the
parent state does not ipso facto become the law of the newly created
state. Law in the new state is a function of that state’s legislature. In
fact, the Pollard and Phillips Petroleum holdings go a step further; they
recognize that new states such as Maine, under the equal-footing
doctrine, “hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the
soils under them for their own common use.”196 Presumably, these rights
can only be lost or modified by enactments of the legislature of the new
state.
Finally, we must deal substantively with the Bell II court’s assertion
that acceptance of the equal-footing doctrine at this time would be
“revisionist . . . history”197—that it would upset settled expectations, and
be (as Bell I argued), “fraught with mischief.”198 The petitioners in
Phillips Petroleum certainly pressed the Court with these same
arguments, asserting:
that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision is inequitable and
would upset various . . . kinds of property expectations and
interests [which] have matured since Mississippi joined the
Union in 1817[,] . . . that they have developed reasonable
expectations based on their record title for these lands, and that
they . . . have paid taxes on these lands for more than a
century.199
The Phillips Petroleum Court was not moved by this importuning,
and the holding in the case flatly rejects these arguments. Reaching back
171 years, the Court held: “[w]e are skeptical . . . that a decision
affirming the judgment below will have sweeping implications, either
within Mississippi or outside that state . . . . Indeed, we believe that it
would be far more upsetting to settled expectations to reverse the
195. Id. at 228-29; the Pollard Court reaffirms the equal-footing doctrine and
Alabama’s right thereunder by citing (almost verbatim) a portion of Chief Justice Taney’s
reasoning in Martin. See supra note 127; compare Martin, 41 U.S. 367, 410, with the
above citation.
196. See Pollard, 44 U.S. at 229.
197. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 172 (Me. 1989).
198. Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 514 (Me. 1986).
199. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469, 481-82 (1988).
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Mississippi Supreme Court decision.”200 The Phillips Petroleum Court
went on: “[t]he fact that petitioners have long been the record title
holders, or long paid taxes on these lands does not change the outcome
here . . . . Consequently, we do not believe that the equitable
considerations petitioners advance divest the State of its ownership in the
disputed tidelands.”201 In closing the Phillips Petroleum Court also
noted, “that under Mississippi law, the State’s ownership of these
[intertidal] lands could not be lost via adverse possession, laches, or any
other equitable doctrine.”202 In short, Mississippi’s intertidal lands could
not be lost merely by the passage of time. The Law Court is urged to
take a similar view with respect to Maine’s intertidal lands.
Summarizing more broadly, it seems clear that the Bell II court’s
failure to appreciate the reaffirming weight given to the equal-footing
doctrine in the Phillips Petroleum case, coupled with its failure to
recognize that the Bell I court had either overlooked or ignored the
significance of the equal-footing doctrine in its use of the Shively case,
was error. These errors, (by both Bell courts) in turn, led both courts to
miss the significance of cases such as Pollard, Knight, and Martin, all of
which explained the meaning and scope of the equal-footing doctrine—a
doctrine certainly meant to apply to all new states, including Maine.
Given this continuous body of U.S. Supreme Court case law, the
amicus briefs’ argued that the Bell II court’s holding should be reversed
by the Law Court. The Maine Legislature should (at long last) be given
the opportunity to exercise the equal-footing doctrine to determine Maine
law with respect to intertidal lands.
X. ARGUMENT: ISSUE VII
If the Law Court reexamines Bell II, we reach Issue VII:
Whether the Bell II court erred in narrowly interpreting the public
uses permitted in the intertidal zone pursuant to the “public easement”
recognized in the Bell cases.
The amicus briefs argued that the Bell II court’s conclusion that
public uses are permitted, but “only” 203 for fishing, fowling, and
navigation, was unduly narrow. The court failed to apply relevant
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 482-83.
Id. at 484.
Id.
Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 169 (Me. 1989).
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property law rules of statutory construction (and case law construing
these rules) to delineate the scope of the “public easement.” It further
erred in failing to acknowledge the much broader range of public use
rights implicit in the historical concept of jus publicum.
If arguments leading to this point are rejected, or, put another way, if
the Law Court leaves in place the central holdings of Bell I and Bell II,
i.e., that upland owners in Maine hold fee simple title to intertidal lands,
subject only to a reserved “public easement,” then “the only question
presented [to the Bell II court, and to the Law Court today] is the scope”
(the breadth) of these reserved public rights on what is now characterized
as privately owned intertidal land.204 This is the question addressed now.
As noted earlier, the Ordinance is the asserted founding document of
this vast alienation of jus publicum property (the intertidal lands of two
states). But, also noted is the fact that the Ordinance is not a deed; it is
not a conventional grant or conveyance of property; it is not the product
of any bargain. If the Storer v. Freeman case205 is accepted at face value,
the Ordinance was widely viewed as an inducement to “wharf out”—an
inducement without any time frame, and one that did not impose any
reciprocal duties on the grantees. It was a gift. No other characterization
of this conferred property interest seems possible.
It seems appropriate, then, to examine both conventional property
law rules of construction, and case law applying such rules, to determine
(as Bell II says we must) “the scope of the rights . . . reserved to the
public.”206 A leading American treatise on property law puts it this way:
“[i]t seems reasonable to attribute to the average transferor an intention
that produces a result which is more in accord with the public interest,
whenever the language he has employed in a donative transaction is
susceptible of different interpretations. Consequently, a preference to
this effect has been recognized.”207
The same treatise points out that when a grantor, who at the outset
has the full quantum of rights, both transfers rights to a grantee, and
retains rights (as the Ordinance is said to have done) the grantor
has/retains the residuum of rights (whether by the fiction of “re-grant” or
a more straight forward “reservation”).208 In other words, the Ordinance
gave grantee(s) what they needed in order to “wharf out,” title in the
204. Id.
205. 6 Mass. 435 (1810).
206. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173.
207. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.3(d) (1952) (emphasis added); see also
Delogu, supra note 103, at 46-47, 50-51.
208. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.24-8.25 (1952) (emphasis added).
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underlying flats—nothing more. Everything else embodied in the
concept of jus publicum, the residuum of public rights in the foreshore,
remained (and remains to this day) in the hands of government in trust
for the public.209
In addition, the treatise makes clear that a grant that is made
gratuitously, that lacks consideration (as was the case with the
Ordinance), is to be construed narrowly against the grantee:
In ascertaining the meaning of a conveyance for the purpose of
determining the scope of an [interest] created by it, account
should be taken of the nature of the conveyance as being
gratuitous or based upon a consideration . . . . In the case of a
gratuitous conveyance, less account need be taken of the
meaning of the conveyance to the grantee.210
Here again, conventional property law rules of construction suggest
that the Bell II court should have read private upland owner rights
narrowly, and should have read the “public easement,” the “reserved”
rights, expansively. The Bell II court, however, did the exact opposite.
The upland owners—grantees under the Ordinance—gave nothing for
what they received, but their rights were significantly enlarged by Bell
II’s holding—public rights were narrowed.
Turning to the case law, both Bell courts relied on Alger,211which the
Bell II court characterized as “a leading case construing and applying the
Ordinance.”212 Chief Justice Shaw, speaking for the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Alger, noted:
When therefore the government did, by such general act [the
Ordinance] grant a right of separate property in the soil of the
sea-shore, to enable the riparian proprietor to erect quays and
wharves for a better access to the sea, and by the same act
reserved some right to individuals and the public of passing and
re-passing with vessels, but without defining it, it seems just and
reasonable to construe such reservation much more liberally in

209. It should also be noted that there is no historical evidence—nothing in the
Ordinance itself, or in cases like Storer, Alger, or Boston Waterfront that a secondary
intent of the Ordinance was to limit or narrow public use rights in the foreshore. That
motive did not exist in 1647. In the minds of many it was not thought possible. In
Massachusetts and Maine, exclusion of the public, and/or limiting public use rights in the
foreshore is a product of late twentieth century private property rights zealotry.
210. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.67 (1952) (emphasis added).
211. 61 Mass. 53 (1851).
212. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 171 n.10 (Me. 1989).
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favor of the right[s] reserved, than it otherwise would be under
other circumstances.213
The court in Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury took a similar
position:
[The Colonial Government] held a prerogative right to the sea
and sea shores, in a fiduciary relation, for the public use. As a
general rule, in all grants from the government to the subject,
the terms of the grant are to be taken most strongly against the
grantee, and in favor of the grantor — reversing the common
rule as between individuals.214
At another point in this opinion, Justice Shaw (who also authored the
Alger opinion) speaking of the scope of what he called the publici juris
(reserved public rights) characterized them as being, “for the use and
benefit of all the subjects, for all useful purposes, the principal of which
were navigation and the fisheries.”215 In other words, one of the
foremost members of Massachusetts’ judiciary, a scholar in his day,
looking back on almost 200 years of post-Ordinance history understood
the appropriate rule/method of statutory construction to be applied in
interpreting reserved public rights. He also understood the fact that those
rights included “all useful purposes”—navigation and fisheries were
important uses, but they were not the only reserved public uses
permitted.216
Beyond these treatise rules of statutory construction, and cases
applying and interpreting these rules, there is further support for this
argument in the fact that the so-called “public easement” is rooted in the
jus publicum, which in turn is rooted in the Justinian view that some
things are inherently incapable of private ownership—the air, running

213. Alger, 61 Mass. at 94 (emphasis added). A reading of all of pages 94-95 seems
useful.
214. Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury, 75 Mass. 451, 492 (Mass. 1857) (emphasis
added).
215. Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
216. See also Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124 (Mass. 1909).
The court takes the position that the trust for the public, under which the state holds and
controls navigable tidewaters, encompasses more than navigation alone—“[i]t is wider in
its scope, and it includes all necessary and proper uses, in the interest of the public.” Id. at
129. The Boston Waterfront case, beyond its discussion of (post-Ordinance) ambiguities
in Massachusetts law with respect to upland owner property rights, also suggests at
several points that reserved public rights were not intended to be, and were not always,
narrowly construed. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp., 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979).
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water, the sea, and the foreshore—an essential interface between dry land
and the sea. 217
The underlying principle of jus publicum in the foreshore grew out of
a belief that this intertidal land area was of necessity public—open to all,
and essentially without limit as to uses. One may as readily dig for
clams, as dive for sponges—or, in Maine, sea urchins. One may use the
foreshore for lateral passage, or to launch a small boat from which one
might fish or travel to another point along the foreshore, or simply sail
for pleasure. One could engage in vast seaborne commerce, launch war
canoes, dry or repair ones nets, or simply sit and watch the sea.218 From
time immemorial, all of these jus publicum and public use activities have
been conducted on the foreshore of Massachusetts, Maine, and every
other state and nation in the world which borders the sea. Different uses
were more or less important at different times. The jus publicum was
infinitely adaptable to the changing needs of a given time and place; that
was the purpose and the beauty of the concept.219
For our purposes, the point to be made is that nothing in the
Ordinance (or in any case law purporting to interpret the Ordinance)
suggests that the jus publicum was intended to be abrogated or limited.
This point bears repeating—the Ordinance, the purported source of the
upland owner’s title, and the public’s remaining reserved rights, does not
use the terms “only” or “delimit[ed]” to circumscribe public use rights.
If one looks at the four lines of the Ordinance said to convey title to
intertidal lands, or the whole of the section titled Liberties Common, or
the whole Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes, one cannot find any
indication that public use rights, jus publicum, was to be “limited” to
fishing, fowling, and navigation—that these were the “only” public use
rights remaining and reserved as part of the jus publicum. This concept
217. Justinian codes date back almost 1500 years and themselves are based on socalled “natural law.” See Tannenbaum, supra note 46, at 107-110.
218. See G. Graham Waite, Public Rights in Maine Waters, 17 ME. L. REV. 161 (1965),
particularly, “The Meaning of the Trust Doctrine in Maine” at 176-178, and “Public
Rights of Access to Waterways and to the Ocean,” at 185-188.
219. To the extent that this foreshore area could be said to be owned, the sovereign or
state was said to be a trustee, the holder of this unique property interest, in trust for the
people. See Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 599, 605-609 (Me. 1981). Moreover,
the sovereign or state must meet fiduciary duties, inherent in the role of trustee, to protect
(by imposing necessary regulations) both the foreshore itself, and the jus publicum.
Finally, in most jurisdictions, including Maine, it is clear that the jus publicum cannot be
lost by prescription or adverse possession. It cannot be given away. It can be alienated,
but only to a limited degree, and then only by legislative action, when larger public
interests are served. See also Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475-478 (1970).
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of limitation is simply not there. It’s not implied, and it’s certainly not in
the language of the Ordinance.
In short, the Bell II court’s holding that the reserved public easement
may be used “only for fishing, fowling, and navigation”220 is an
unwarranted judicially fashioned fiction. To be sure, fishing, fowling,
and navigation are specifically mentioned in the Ordinance as permitted
public uses—they were examples of the most common and the most
obvious public uses of the day. But there is no suggestion in the critical
four lines of the Ordinance, the Liberties Common, or the Book of the
General Lawes and Libertyes that a rule of ejusdem generis was to be
applied; that the drafters of the Ordinance intended to exclude any/all
other public uses; that the historic elasticity of the concept of jus
publicum, was to be frozen in time; that new public uses of intertidal land
that could not be fitted into the rubrics of fishing, fowling, navigation,
would be barred forever; or, that upland owners (beyond the title
conferred) would forevermore have the right to exclude people and uses
that could not fit themselves into the stated rubrics. It’s preposterous—
these intentions and motives did not exist in 1647. There is no
suggestion that they existed in any of the documents noted above, and no
such suggestion has been found in any colonial histories, or in the
writings of any legal historians, to permit the inference that limiting the
jus publicum rights was one of the intentions of those who drafted the
Ordinance.
On the contrary, there is considerable evidence (at least in Maine)
that the explicit limitations fashioned by the Bell II court did not exist
prior to that court’s holding.221 For example, no Maine case can be

220. See Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 169 (Me. 1989).
221. At this point the Bell II court is in something of a dilemma—it has fashioned an
unwarranted limitation on public use rights and rigidly applied it to the case at hand. But,
at the same time, it must acknowledge a body of Maine case law holding that ‘fishing,’
‘fowling,’ and ‘navigation’ uses may be undertaken for pleasure or commercial purposes,
or to provide sustenance. See e.g., Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 449 (1882).
Other cases cited in the Bell II opinion have sympathetically interpreted what is
encompassed within the terms fishing, fowling, and navigation.
For example, the operator of a power boat for hire may pick up and land his
passengers on intertidal land, Andrews v. King, 129 A. 298 (1925); and
“navigation” also includes the right to travel over frozen waters, French v. Camp,
18 Me. 433 (1841), to moor vessels and discharge and take on cargo on intertidal
land, State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9, 24 (1856); and, after landing, “to pass freely to the
lands and houses of others besides the owners of the flats,” Deering v. Proprietors
of Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51, 65 (1845). Similarly, we have broadly construed
“fishing” to include digging for worms, State v. Lemar, 87 A.2d 886 (1952),
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found that bars simply “walking” within the intertidal zone. No Maine
case can be found (prior to Bell II) embracing the dubious distinctions
and reasoning of Butler v. Attorney General.222 In Butler, the right to
“swim” or “float” in public intertidal waters is said to be a permitted
public use, but “bathing” is not a public use.223 One is at a loss to see the
logic of this distinction, or how it would be enforced by an upland owner
(or court) intent on limiting the jus publicum to fishing, fowling, and
navigation.
There are also historical records/studies in Maine that evidence the
felt need to maintain both narrow upland areas, and almost all intertidal
areas, both for lateral passage and the storage of people, boats, wagons,
and animals.224 In the first serious settling of the Town of Cumberland
(in the 1730s), for example, a three rod wide (49.5 feet) swath of upland
was to be kept open for public use, and almost all of the initial property
conveyances in the town bounded by the sea were specifically extended
only to mean high.225 The intertidal land was to be kept open for lateral
passage—this was at the time an essential public use right.226
From statehood (1820) until Bell II (1989), no Maine case can be
found that successfully challenged “walking,” “swimming,” “floating,”
“bathing,” and “lateral passage”—activities well beyond the fishing,
clams, State v. Leavitt, 72 A. 875 (1909), and shellfish, Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me.
472 (1854).
Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173. Unlike Bell II, none of these cases undertakes to limit public use
rights. On the contrary, they each incrementally broaden public use rights.
The Bell II court was not inclined to overrule this long line of cases. Instead, it
disingenuously expresses a sympathy for this liberality—a sympathy not borne out by its
holding, and certainly not borne out by plaintiffs in the two cases now before the Law
Court. More importantly, however, the long line of Maine cases the Bell II court would
adroitly side-step give credence to the argument that the limitations on the jus publicum
that Bell II imposed are not embodied in either the Colonial Ordinance itself, or prior
Maine case law. They have instead been fashioned out of whole cloth by the Bell II court
and thus can and should be overturned by the Law Court.
222. 80 N.E. 688 (Mass. 1907).
223. Id. at 689.
224. See ORLANDO DELOGU, AN EXAMINATION AND UPDATING OF RESEARCH RELATIVE
TO TOWN OF CUMBERLAND CLAIMS TO UPLAND ALONG THE FORESHORE AND TO
INTERTIDAL LANDS (1991). This source is on file in the University of Maine School of
Law Library, and Cleaves Law Library.
225. Id. Interesting, too, is the fact that some eighty years after passage of the
Ordinance, no one in the Massachusetts legislative body authorizing the Proprietors of
the Town of Cumberland to make initial conveyances of what presumably was public
domain land, felt bound by the Ordinance to convey these (approximately one hundred)
littoral parcels to mean low water.
226. See Delogu, supra note 224, at 13-18.
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fowling, and navigation limitations said to exist. This fact must be seen
as evidence that no one, not upland owners or the public at large,
believed that these activities were barred. Stated more affirmatively,
upland owners and the public at large believed that the jus publicum
encompassed these activities and more as needs may dictate.227
Depending on one’s view, the Ordinance may have conveyed to littoral
landowners a “title” to intertidal land, a “qualified title” to intertidal land,
or a mere “license” to use, fill, and thereby gain title to intertidal land.
But there is full agreement that the Ordinance did not convey to littoral
landowners a “fee simple absolute title” to intertidal land. The broad
range of reserved public use rights always remained in the hands of the
state in trust for the people.228
In sum, the Bell II court failed to consider relevant and conventional
property law rules of construction, and it ignored case holdings urging
application of these rules. These were errors that led to further errors by
the Bell II court, i.e., a failure to appreciate that the Ordinance grant of
intertidal land to upland owners left a broad range of public uses, the jus
publicum in governmental hands in trust for the public. There can be
little doubt that whatever property the upland owners received under the

227. Interestingly, New Hampshire law is strikingly similar to the reasoning laid out
above. As the New Hampshire Supreme Court explained in 1890:
[T]he legal title of New Hampshire land was in the king, who held it as trustee in
his official and representative capacity . . . . The seashore, arms of the sea, and
large ponds, by reason of their special adaptation to public uses, were set apart and
reserved as public waters . . . . “The use of navigable waters is inalienable . . . . ”
Land covered by public water is capable of many uses. Rights of navigation and
fishery are not in the whole estate. . . . He [the king] “held the seashores as well as
the land under the sea,” and other property of the same public class, “for the use
and benefit of all the subjects, for all useful purposes, the principal of which were
navigation and the fisheries.”
Concord Mfg. v. Robertson, 25 A. 718, 721 (N.H. 1890) (emphasis added).
228. See James v. Inhabitants of Town of West Bath, 437 A.2d 863 (Me. 1981).
Holding that state regulation of worm digging preempted local regulations, the court
further noted:
A consistent theme in the decisional law is the concept that Maine’s tidal lands and
resources, including marine worms, are held by the State in a public trust for the
people of the State. The state, unless it has parted with title, owns the bed of all
tidal waters within its jurisdiction as well as such waters themselves so far as they
are capable of ownership, and has full power to regulate and control fishing therein
for the benefit of all the people.
Id. at 865-6 (quoting State v. Lemar, 87 A.2d 886, 887 (Me. 1952)). At another point, the
court states: “The continued vitality of the public trust doctrine was recently reaffirmed in
Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981).” James, 437 A.2d at n.5.
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Ordinance, they took it with full knowledge that a robust jus publicum
remained in place.
Bell II’s major error, however, was its summary conclusion that
Massachusetts’, and thus Maine’s post-Ordinance intertidal land law not
only gave fee title to upland owners subject to a reserved “public
easement,” but that this easement was “delimit[ed]”229—it encompassed
“only fishing, fowling, and navigation.”230 By affixing these words of
limitation—“delimit” and “only”—to the Ordinance (words that are not
in the Ordinance, not implied, and that were not intended by the drafters
of the Ordinance), the Bell II court has again erred. These errors have
expanded the rights of upland owners, and concomitantly narrowed
public use rights and stultified the jus publicum. Prior to Bell II, no
Maine court had similarly held.
The Bell II court’s unduly narrow delineation of the “scope” of
reserved public rights and uses of intertidal land is both unwarranted and
legally unsustainable; it runs counter to the very cases and authorities the
court purports to rely upon. It is a conclusion that almost certainly would
not have been reached had the cited treatise and case law injunctions
been followed, and/or if the court had fully grasped the purpose and
meaning of the concept and doctrine of jus publicum.
The latter concept has never been a static one. Public uses of critical,
unique intertidal lands have continuously changed over time; they must
continue to do so. Bell II has the effect of freezing the public use rights
at a point in time nearly 350 years ago. The dominant public uses then,
become the “only” public uses permitted now. Changed conditions,
changed needs, new technologies, and whole new realities for public use
of intertidal land can no longer be taken into account by an evolving
body of law.
This litany of error should be recognized by the Law Court and
appropriate modifications of the Bell II holding fashioned—
modifications that both recognize a broadened range of reserved public
use rights in Maine and/or that fully recognize the legislative enactment
struck down by the Bell II holding.231 In short, Bell II’s “piece of judicial
legislation” is egregious error which the amicus briefs call upon the Law
Court to reverse.232 In doing so, the jus publicum will be reaffirmed, and
229. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1886) (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
231. Intertidal Land Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 571-573 (2005).
232. In Concord Manufacturing, the New Hampshire Supreme Court recognizes in a
related context that alienation of trust property is a legislative function:
[T]he title of the soil under large ponds and tide waters [held to be trust property]
does not pass by an ordinary governmental grant of land bounded by or on them.
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a range of public uses commensurate with today’s needs, and able to
adjust to tomorrow’s changing conditions, can emerge.
XI. ARGUMENT: ISSUE VIII
If the Law Court reexamines Bell II, we reach Issue VIII:
Whether the Bell II court erred in concluding that The Intertidal Land
Act233 constituted a taking of the upland owners’ private property,
including whether the recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Stop the Beach
Renourishment234 should alter the Bell II court’s analysis.
The amicus briefs argued that the Bell II court had erred in
concluding that the Act constituted a taking and that this error is
underscored by the recently decided Stop the Beach Renourishment case.
It must also be recognized that if any one of the substantive arguments
previously advanced235 are acceded to by the Law Court, the whole
paradigm is shifted. The Intertidal Land Act will not have effected a
taking of any upland owner property because the Law Court will have
recognized either that the boundary of upland owner property236 does not
reach below mean high237 or that, even if title to intertidal land remains
with the upland owner, the residuum of the jus publicum remains with
the state, in trust for the people.238 In either case, the Intertidal Land Act
will not have invaded any private property right or interest of upland
. . . [a]n alienation of the title of soil is not an exercise of executive [or judicial]
power, and cannot be effected without legislative authority.
Concord Mfg. v. Robertson, 25 A. 718, 720 (N.H. 1890).
233. tit. 12 §§ 571-573 (2005) (permitting the public to use intertidal lands for
recreational purposes).
234. 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2592 (2010).
235. Issues II, III, IV, IV, IV, or VII.
236. To be completely accurate, it should be noted that there is an exception for the
relatively few parcels where adjacent intertidal land, now filled, was validly alienated
pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act.
237. If the Law Court reaches this conclusion, it will have explicitly or implicitly found
that the state holds title to intertidal land in trust for the people—the prevailing view in
the United States will be reestablished as the law in Maine.
238. Even if, in addressing Issue VII, the Law Court does little more than expand the
“scope” of the reserved “public easement” (beyond the narrow fishing, fowling, and
navigation), the point being made here remains accurate. The Intertidal Land Act would
appropriately be seen as prior legislative action paralleling the court’s action (no taking).
The Intertidal Land Act’s inclusion of police power regulatory measures designed to
protect intertidal lands, and public use thereof, is quite clearly not a taking of any upland
owner property interest.
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owners. It simply stands as a permissible legislative Act defining the jus
publicum; a current range of permitted public uses of intertidal land are
spelled out and some regulatory measures designed to protect intertidal
land are fashioned. The enactment applies only to property interests held
by the state, in trust for the public.
Even if all of the substantive arguments previously advanced by the
amicus briefs are rejected by Law Court, leaving upland owners with fee
title to intertidal lands, the Intertidal Land Act is still not an
unconstitutional taking of upland owner property, as takings law is
currently defined by national and Maine cases.239 If one asks: does the
Intertidal Land Act take some property interest, however small, of upland
landowners? The answer is: yes. The upland owner’s right to preclude
many recreational uses240 in the intertidal zone would no longer be
permitted. But this is not the relevant question; the answer tells you
nothing as to whether an unconstitutional taking has occurred. Every
zoning-type regulation in the country, permitting some uses in a
particular zone and prohibiting others, takes away some element of
private property prerogative. But zoning regulations have long been
deemed, necessary, and constitutionally permissible—not a taking. The
leading U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with regulatory takings,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,241 noted that: “[g]overnment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”242
In other words, not all regulations which diminish property rights are
constitutionally impermissible—some are simply reasonable exercises by
government of the police power necessary to protect some aspect of the
public’s health, safety, or general welfare. In determining whether a
particular regulation is a reasonable, uncompensated diminution of a
private property right, or an unconstitutional taking of that right,
Pennsylvania Coal was also helpful. The Court noted: “the general rule,
at least, is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”243 So the real
question that must be asked and answered here is: does the Intertidal
Land Act go “too far”?
239. See Orlando Delogu, The Law of Taking Elsewhere and One Suspect in Maine, 52
ME. L. REV. 323, 325-33, 353-54 (2000).
240. Intertidal Land Act does not affect all recreational uses. Both the state and upland
owners agree that, pursuant to the reserved “public easement,” recreational fishing,
boating, and bird shooting are already permitted public uses in intertidal land.
241. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
242. Id. at 413.
243. Id. at 415.
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It does not. By any of the conventional factors courts use to
determine whether a regulatory statute is reasonable, or a taking, the
Intertidal Land Act passes the reasonable test. The first thing courts
often ask is whether the intrusion on the private property right serves a
valid public interest. The Intertidal Land Act restricts imprudent
intertidal land uses, and it makes clear that municipalities may participate
in regulating intertidal land use—provisions that benefit upland owners
and the public alike.244
The Intertidal Land Act’s authorization of recreational use within the
intertidal zone by members of the public is nothing more than the
recognition of a changed condition, a new reality that was unforeseen
and unforeseeable at the time the reserved “public easement” was
fashioned. The new reality put simply is that the recreational use of
intertidal land is as economically valuable in the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries as “wharfing out” (i.e. marine commerce and fishing) was
in the colonial era. This recognition is obvious to the public, and to
courts and legislatures in other coastal states.245 This recognition
breathes life into the common law, and is correctly seen as an exercise by
the Maine legislature of its long-standing prerogative to define, modify,
expand, and/or abrogate the common law. It seems well within the
legislative powers clause of the Maine Constitution.
Another factor examined by courts in determining whether a
regulation is reasonable, or a taking, is the economic consequences of the
regulation. Is the diminution in value caused by the regulation shocking
or inconsequential? Maine cases, and the case law of most jurisdictions,
suggests that fairly large diminutions in value occasioned by the
imposition of a regulation will be sustained—not a taking—if the
economic value that remains with the regulation in place still provides a
244. Intertidal Land Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 571-573 (2005).
245. For example, in Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, the New
Jersey Supreme Court noted:
We have no difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of the twentieth century, the
public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation
and fishing, but extend as well to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming
and other shore activities. The public trust doctrine, like all common law
principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and
extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to
benefit. The legislature appears to have had such an extension in mind in enacting
N.J.S.A. 12:3-33, 34, previously mentioned.
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972);
see also Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984)
(“extension of the public trust doctrine to include bathing, swimming, and other shore
activities is consonant with and furthers the general welfare”).
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reasonable economic return to the property owner.246 Whichever way
one approaches the economic consequences of the Intertidal Land Act, it
seems fair to say that it has had little, or no, economic impact on the
value of upland property. These properties were not depressed in value
before the Bell holdings, when a broad range of recreational uses of
intertidal land was common, and they have not shot up in value since
Bell II declared the Intertidal Land Act to be a taking. In other words,
the economic consequences of the Intertidal Land Act are negligible.
This would suggest that the regulation is not a taking.
A third factor often looked to in determining whether a regulation is
permissible or a taking, is the reasonable expectations of property
owners, particularly “investment-backed expectations.” This formulation
for examining the taking question derives from another widely cited U.S.
Supreme Court case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York.247
What then were the “reasonable investment-backed
expectations” of the Bell plaintiffs? Arguably, there were not any in this
case because there was no investment. Bell’s predecessors in title were
the beneficiaries of a windfall, a gift bestowed on them by the Ordinance.
Can one reasonably expect such fortuity? Not usually. The loss of a
windfall can hardly be characterized as a taking.
Given these beginnings, was it reasonable for the grantee to expect
that some reciprocal duty would never be imposed? Hardly. Was it
reasonable for the grantee to expect that the reservation would be
interpreted narrowly against the interests of the grantor, in this case, the
public? Hardly. Was it reasonable for the grantee to expect that the
reserved rights would be frozen in time—that they would never be
adjusted to take into account changed conditions, new and unforeseen
public uses of intertidal land? Hardly. Expectations like these are not
reasonable.
If the questions are put the other way one might ask: is it reasonable
for the Bell plaintiffs, beneficiaries of a gift, to seek the narrowest
interpretation of the reserved public easement? It is not. Is it reasonable
for the Bell plaintiffs, and the Bell II court, to claim that the Intertidal
Land Act is a taking because it deprives upland owners of “the general
right to exclude others”? It is not. There never was a general right to
exclude others. It’s a fiction demonstrating the unreasonableness of the
Bell plaintiffs and the illogic of the Bell II holding.

246. See Hall v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot. 528 A.2d 453 (Me. 1987).
247. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that none of the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of Penn Central were cut off by the regulation—there was no taking).
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Passage of the Ordinance may have given upland owners a title to
intertidal land, but, at the very least, a reserved “public easement” was
simultaneously created. Stated more generously, the residuum of public
use rights, the jus publicum, continued. These interests, however
characterized, are held in trust by government, and serve to retain longstanding public access to, and public use of, intertidal land. Whether by
Ordinance or jus publicum or both, access and use rights were intended
to benefit the public the whole public.248 Whether one looks to the
Ordinance or to the jus publicum, no member of the public was, or could
be, excluded by upland owners; not historically, not now. In short, the
public has always had access to intertidal land. The Intertidal Land Act
merely broadens and makes explicit the uses available to today’s public
pursuant to this right of access. And, as shown above, it does so in a
manner that does not rise to the level of a taking.249
Finally, Alger,250 the case most often relied upon by the Bell courts,
anticipated the very issues raised here. Chief Justice Shaw, while
confirming the title of upland owners arising out of the Ordinance,
stated:
[T]he riparian proprietor[s] . . . must have well understood that
all estate[s] granted by the government to individuals is subject,
by reasonable implication, to such restraints in its use, as shall
make the enjoyment of it by the grantee consistent with the equal

248. The Bell II court’s flawed reasoning on this point draws heavily on the flawed
reasoning and takings analysis of a Massachusetts advisory opinion. Opinion of the
Justices (Mass. Opinion), 313 N.E.2d 561, 567-569 (Mass. 1974). The Mass. Opinion is
premised on the view that the Ordinance gave upland owners fee title which drew with it
a general right to exclude. Such a view is inconsistent with both the reserved public
easement and the jus publicum, which could not be alienated, and which guaranteed a
general public right of access to intertidal land. Long-standing rights of lateral passage,
sitting, storing nets, grazing animals, et cetera, bear out the fact that this general right of
access extended beyond the access for fishing, fowling, and navigation specifically noted
in the Ordinance. The errors of the Massachusetts court were followed almost word for
word by the Bell II court (see Bell II, 557 A.2d at 177-178) and led to Bell II’s erroneous
holding that the Intertidal Land Act was a taking. These compounded errors should not
be perpetuated.
249. Bell II’s reliance on cases such as Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. is misplaced. In these cases, prior to
regulation, there was no preexisting right to use or access the property—here, there
clearly is. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
250. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851).
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enjoyment by others [the public] of their several and common
rights . . . .251
Chief Justice Shaw continued:
Considering, therefore, that all real estate derived from the
government is subject to some restraint for the general good,
whether such restraint be regarded as a police regulation [or] of
any other character; considering that sea-shore estate, though
held in fee by the riparian proprietor, both on account of the
qualified reservation under which the grant was made, and the
peculiar nature and character, position and relations of the estate,
and the great public interests associated with it, is more
especially subject to some reasonable restraints, in order that
the exercise of full dominion over it, by the proprietor, may not
be noxious to others, and injurious to the public, the court are of
opinion that the legislature has power, by a general law affecting
all riparian proprietors on the same line of shore equally and
alike, to make reasonable regulations, declaring the public right,
and providing for its preservation by reasonable restraints, and to
enforce these restraints by suitable penalties.252
All of Chief Justice Shaw’s foregoing arguments suggest that the
Bell II court’s conclusion that the Intertidal Land Act was a taking of
property are incorrectly premised and incorrectly apply current takings
law. The Intertidal Land Act is a legislative exercise of the Maine’s
power to clarify or redefine the common law (the jus publicum, the
reserved public right), to adjust to new realities, new valuable uses of
intertidal land. At the same time, the Intertidal Land Act is an exercise
of police power, a regulatory measure that confers benefits on both
upland owners and the public. It does not go “too far.” The Intertidal
Land Act is therefore entitled to deference by the Law Court; it follows
then that the Law Court should reverse the holding of Bell II, and to
declare the Intertidal Land Act valid and fully operational.
The above arguments were buttressed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in Stop the Beach Renourishment,253 handed down even while
251. Id. at 94. A complete reading of this portion of the opinion seems useful.
252. Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
253. 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). In accordance with Law Court briefing
schedules, the McGarvey amicus brief was submitted to the court on June 2, 2010; it
contains no reference to Stop the Beach Renourishment. The Flaherty amicus brief
submitted to the Law Court on June 30, 2010 contains argument (Issue VIII in that brief)
that relies on the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stop the Beach Renourishment that
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briefs in the Flaherty and McGarvey cases were being submitted. On the
critical (for our purposes) taking issue in Stop the Beach Renourishment,
the U.S. Supreme Court (by a vote of 8-0)254 affirmed Florida’s highest
court and sustained what seems an axiomatic proposition: that in order
for a “taking” argument to succeed, the party who claims its property
interest has been taken, must show that it actually possesses the property
interest in question.255 The littoral upland owners in the Florida case, and
in Bell II, failed to meet this threshold requirement; thus their “taking”
claim fails. Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, noted:
There is no taking unless petitioner can show that, before the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision [sustaining the State’s claim to
the renourished beach], littoral property owners had rights to
future accretions and contact with the water superior to the
State’s right to fill in its submerged land. Though some may
think the question close, in our view the showing cannot be
made.256
The Court went on to note that the Takings Clause only protects
property rights as they are established under state law, not as they might
have been established or ought to have been established.257 We cannot
say that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision eliminated a right of
accretion established under Florida law.258 In short, no property interest
means no valid “taking” claim.
A second aspect of the case worth noting is that the Court in Stop the
Beach Renourishment puts the threshold burden of showing that a
property interest exists squarely on the petitioner, the party claiming
there is a “taking.”259 The mere assertion of a “taking” claim does not
shift the threshold burden onto the state to show that its actions do not
constitute a “taking.” The relevance of these aspects of the Stop the
Beach Renourishment holding to issues currently before the Law Court
seems clear. Bell II held that the Intertidal Land Act constituted a
“taking” of littoral upland owners’ property. But Stop the Beach
Renourishment prompts one to ask—what property interest of littoral
seemingly precludes Bell II’s finding that Maine’s Intertidal Land Act constituted a
taking of upland owner property interests.
254. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.
255. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. at 2611.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2612.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 2611. Justice Scalia makes clear that the littoral property owners theory,
“puts the burden on the wrong party.” Id.
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upland owners is invaded by the Intertidal Land Act? Did the Bell
plaintiffs meet their burden of showing that a protectable property
interest exists? The short answer to these questions is: none and no.
The Intertidal Land Act does not challenge any aspect of littoral
upland owners’ purported title to intertidal land; nor does it encourage or
permit any invasion, by any member of the public of the upland portion
(the area above the mean high tideline) of the littoral landowners’
property.260 If the Intertidal Land Act did either of these two things, a
“taking” claim might very well lie. The question, then, remains—what
property right of littoral upland owners involving intertidal land is
invaded by the Intertidal Land Act?
As noted earlier, the Bell II court accepted in total the Massachusetts
court’s reasoning that the Ordinance conveyed a title to littoral upland
owners of intertidal lands; the court also held that this title drew with it a
“right to exclude the public.”261 But even if one concedes, for the sake of
argument, that littoral upland owners have some form of title to intertidal
land, what they do not have is a “fee simple absolute” title.262 All parties
concede that the Ordinance, the granting instrument, simultaneously gave
rise to a public easement specifically allowing within the intertidal zone
public access (at a minimum) for fishing, fowling, and navigation. This
precludes characterization of the upland owner’s title to this land as
“absolute”; they do not have all of the sticks in the property rights
bundle. Because the whole public may exercise the public easement then
no one can be excluded by upland owners from the intertidal zone.
Further limiting upland owners’ claimed right to exclude the public
from intertidal land is the previously noted fact that the Ordinance
contains no language that limits the reserved public easement to access
for fishing, fowling, and navigation only. 263 No such limiting language
can be found anywhere in the Ordinance. A non-trespassory access to
engage in other public uses of intertidal land, such as sitting, walking,
lateral passage, or the temporary grazing of animals, has a long history
that both pre-dates and post-dates the Ordinance. There is no evidence
supporting the assertion that upland owners’ (who have less than “fee
260. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, the Court, littoral landowners, and the state all
agreed that if the renourishment project had extended above the mean high tide line, the
state would have had to acquire the upland property it needed, or a “taking” claim would
certainly lie. See id. at 2600 n.2.
261. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 178 (Me. 1989).
262. This point is important because only an “absolute” title, a title that includes all of
the sticks in the property rights bundle, would allow the holders of such title the right to
exclude whom they will from the property.
263. See supra arguments under Issue VII.
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simple absolute” title to intertidal land) could exclude members of the
public who would engage in these activities in the intertidal zone. No
Maine cases have been found that bar the public from engaging in these
activities.
And finally on this point, historically broad public access and use
rights were part of the jus publicum, which as previously noted were not
abridged or abrogated by any express language in the Ordinance. These
jus publicum rights,264 which were held in trust, by the original colonial
government, and which are now held by a successor government, the
State of Maine, dictate that upland owners (who, at most, hold a title to
intertidal land that is not “absolute”) have no right to exclude the public
who would engage in these jus publicum access and use rights in the
intertidal zone.265
In sum, the Bell II court’s reasoning that the Intertidal Land Act is a
taking because the Intertidal Land Act infringed upon the upland owner’s
right to exclude the public from these lands, is not borne out by the facts.
Upland owners do not have “fee simple absolute” title to intertidal
land—thus they have no right to exclude anyone from the intertidal zone.
The public (every member of the public), either through the reserved
public easement created by the Ordinance itself, or by the grantors
retention of the residuum of rights not expressly granted by the
Ordinance, or by application of the far more ancient jus publicum
264. Jus publicum access rights certainly include fishing, fowling, and navigation
(broadly defined). Historically, they included sitting, walking, lateral passage, the
temporary grazing of animals, and today they would almost certainly include general
beach-related recreation activities: bathing, surfing, kite-flying, and scuba diving—not to
mention structures that house or support water-related recreational pursuits. This list is
not intended to be exclusive, and it will, as history shows us, evolve over time.
265. Bell I and Bell II do not hold that the jus publicum has been abrogated. To do so
would have required them to ignore or overrule any number of Massachusetts and Maine
cases which, long after the Ordinance came into being, allude to the continuing existence
of the jus publicum. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 90 (1851); Boston
Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Mass., 393 N.E.2d 356, 359 (1979); and in Maine, Moulton v.
Libbey, 37 Me. 472, 485-486 (1854); Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 605 (Me.
1981). The Bell cases suggest, without any analysis or case law support, that jus
publicum rights of access and use have been conflated with and are limited, defined by,
the public easement reserved in the Ordinance. They go so far as to suggest that littoral
upland owners in Maine are now trustees of whatever public access and use rights exist.
See Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 171 (Me. 1886). But the Ordinance itself does not say, or even
suggest this; this view, as noted, is contrary to conventional property law rules for
gratuitous conveyances. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.24, 8.25, 8.67 (1952).
Finally, no Maine case has been found that has taken a view similar to that of the Bell II
holding. The Bell II court’s reasoning is an error built on an error, and ought not to be
perpetuated by the Law Court. See supra note 248 (citing to Mass. Opinion).
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doctrine, has both access to intertidal land and a wide range of historic
and modern use rights.
The conclusion is clear: the Intertidal Land Act does not effect a
taking, because it has not infringed on any property right held by littoral
upland owners.266 Equally clear is the fact that the holding in Stop the
Beach Renourishment requires that before a taking claim can be brought
one must possess a unique property right and demonstrate that this right
has been infringed by some governmental action. The littoral upland
owners in Bell II have not met these requirement, thus there is no taking.
An attenuated argument that upland owners have a property in
dictating the uses that the public may undertake while in the intertidal
zone also fails. Suffice it to say there is nothing in the Ordinance that
suggests that these grantees were also given a right or property-type
interest to pick, choose, identify, or shape in any way, the public uses
permitted or barred in the reserved public easement. This bears
repeating—there is no language, not even a hint, in the Ordinance that
the power to dictate or limit future uses of intertidal land was conferred.
To be sure, fishing, fowling, and navigation are specifically
mentioned in the Ordinance as permitted public uses. However, as
previously noted, these were examples of the most common, the most
obvious public uses of the day. But there is no suggestion in the critical
four lines of the Ordinance that the drafters of the Ordinance intended to
exclude any or all other public uses; or, that they clothed these grantees
and their successors with a power to limit or bar future uses of public
intertidal lands that an elected legislative body would deem necessary
and appropriate to define or explicate the jus publicum, enabling it to
meet the needs of that day.
An analogy to modern zoning law is apt. Can property owners
subject to a validly enacted zoning law dictate permitted uses in a given
zone? Can they dictate uses that will be barred in the future? Can they
preclude the governing body from changing permitted and prohibited
uses as changed conditions over time may dictate? Obviously not. A
landowner has no property interest in an existing framework of zoning
law. Similarly, littoral upland owners have no property interest allowing
them to dictate or limit public uses in the intertidal zone.
An even more attenuated argument might suggest that the Bell II
court has recognized or conferred on upland owners a property-type
interest that the Ordinance did not convey. Can the Bell II court in the
266. The littoral owners’ claim some type of qualified title to these lands is not
infringed; the upland portion of their littoral estate is not infringed; and they had no right
to exclude anyone from intertidal land to begin with.
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same breath claim to be the source of the property right and assert that
the legislature’s passage of the Intertidal Land Act has infringed this
right, thus giving rise to a taking claim? This proposition seems
untenable. As previous arguments have noted, it is not supported by
separation of powers principles, or the holding in Stop the Beach
Renourishment.
One might begin by noting that courts almost never create property
rights. The regulatory process, exercises of police power, contract law,
and acts of legislatures267 are the sources of property rights. In Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Florida statutes268 shaped the law that delineated
the line between accretion and avulsion; that law, in turn gave rise to the
holding that the beach renourishment in question did not infringe any
property interest of littoral upland owners, and thus, that no “taking”
claim existed.
In the same vein, Maine’s Intertidal Land Act delineated permitted
public uses in the intertidal zone more precisely than they had been.
Clearly, the Colonial Ordinance did not express an intention to exclude
public uses other than those noted; nor does it clothe the grantees or their
successors with a power to limit or bar other public uses of intertidal land
in the future. But that’s precisely what upland owners were seeking to
do; that’s the mindset that eventually gave rise to the Bell cases. In this
context, it was both necessary and appropriate for the Maine Legislature
to enact the Intertidal Land Act.
Prior to Bell II the Legislature’s right/duty to reshape the common
law, the jus publicum, to more fully meet public needs, had seldom been
questioned, much less found to be an unconstitutional “taking.” The Bell
II court erred in doing so here; its errors trace back to its misreading of
what the Colonial Ordinance did, and did not do. The court also erred in
its application of conventional takings law to the facts and statute before
it, and in the lack of deference shown to legislative enactments, i.e., the
Intertidal Land Act.
This brings us to Stop the Beach Renourishment, a case decided
subsequent to Bell II, but a case that the Law Court can and should take
into account in reviewing Bell II’s takings analysis. The key holdings in
Stop the Beach Renourishment are that a property interest must be shown
267. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Court noted
that: “protected interests in property are normally not created by the Constitution. Rather,
they are created and their dimensions are defined by an independent source such as state
statutes or rules.” Id. at 577; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
268. See Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. __, 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2600 (2010).
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to exist before a “taking” claim will lie, and that the burden is on the
petitioners (here, littoral upland property owners) to show that a property
right (here a right to dictate future public uses in the intertidal zone)
actually exists.269 Amicus Brief #2 argued that littoral upland owners (the
Bell plaintiffs) did not meet these threshold requirements. It seems clear
that no property interest of these littoral owners was invaded; that they
do not possess either a right to exclude members of the public from the
intertidal zone, or a right to dictate or limit future public uses in the
intertidal zone. Ergo, Stop the Beach Renourishment bars a takings
claim.
It follows then that the Bell II court’s conclusion that the Intertidal
Land Act constitutes a “taking” should not be allowed to stand. The Law
Court, in the cases now before it, was urged to reverse Bell II. It seems
clear that the Intertidal Land Act is both constitutional and necessary
legislation that breathes life into the jus publicum.
XII. ARGUMENT: ISSUE IX
If the Law Court declines to re-examine both Bell I and Bell II in
deciding the two cases before it, we reach Issue IX:
Whether the Maine Superior Court in McGarvey v. Whittredge
correctly held that the term “navigation” allows the public to use
intertidal land to gain access to deeper water for the purpose of engaging
in recreational or commercial scuba diving.
The amicus briefs argued that the superior court’s holding on this
point is correct and should be affirmed. The superior court, bound by the
Bell cases, framed the issues correctly. Bell II held that the reserved
“public easement” was limited to “fishing, fowling, and navigation.”
Defendants, as members of the public, must show that their activities fall
within the parameters of one of these three terms of art. If they can, the
activity is permitted; if they cannot, the activity is barred.
The superior court had little difficulty determining that defendants
use of plaintiffs’ intertidal land to picnic and socialize with clients before
and after scuba diving activities did not fall within the parameters of any

269. Whether the property right arises from state regulatory measures, statutory
enactments, or arises from language in the original Ordinance grant is a matter of
indifference—but, it must be shown to independently exist; it cannot be fashioned out of
whole cloth by the judicial branch of government.

2010]

Friend of the Court

109

of the permitted uses.270 The court characterized these actions as a
“trespass” and awarded nominal damages.271 But merely walking across
plaintiffs intertidal land to ingress or egress the water for the purpose of
teaching or engaging in scuba diving was held by the court to be within
the term “navigation,” and therefore a permitted public use.272
The court’s decision seems to turn on a question it poses to itself,
“whether the law [the definition of navigation] is captive of the practices
that existed in 1647 or has it evolved?”273 The court immediately
answers its question by drawing upon case law, noted in the Bell II
dissenting opinion,274 which clearly indicates that the terms “fishing” and
“navigation” have both evolved over time.275 Focusing on “navigation,”
the court cites Marshall v. Walker276 and Andrews v. King,277 in
particular. The Marshall court, speaking of intertidal land, noted that:
[T]he jus publicum remains. [The public] may sail over them
[flats], may moor their craft upon them, may allow their vessels
to rest upon the soil when bare, may land and walk upon them,
may ride or skate over them when covered with water-bearing
ice, may fish in the water over them, may dig shellfish in them,
may take sea manure from them. . . .278
The Andrews court adds: “[t]he right of navigation so reserved is not
simply the right to sail over the flats, when covered with water . . . but
includes the right of mooring on the flats, of unloading the cargo upon
270. McGarvey, WASHSC-CV-08-42 at 9.
271. Id. Neither party to these proceedings contested this holding of the lower court.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 6.
274. See Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 186-187 (Me. 1989). The court could also have cited
cases that the Bell II majority acknowledged had broadened the term navigation under the
rubrics of “a sympathetically generous interpretation” of the term, and/or that were
deemed “reasonably incidental or related thereto.” Id. at 173.
275. McGarvey, WASHSC-CV-08-42 at 7-8. A broader range of authority supports
this view. See 2 MAINE LAW AFFECTING MARINE RESOURCES 235 (1970) (“[T]he modern
interpretation of the right of navigation is much broader than the English common law
right of navigation or the right of navigation expressed in the Colonial Ordinances. . . .”
This treatise goes on to lay out Maine case law that gave rise to an expanded array of
“fishing” and “navigation” related uses. Id. at 236-41; see also Whittlesey, Law of the
Seashore, Tide-waters and Great Ponds in Massachusetts and Maine (1932) (“In Maine,
however, the courts have extended the public privileges on flats and navigable rivers to
include . . . [cases fashioning an expanded array of fishing and navigation uses are then
laid out].”). Id. at 14.
276. 45 A. 497 (Me. 1900).
277. 129 A. 298 (Me. 1925).
278. Marshall, 45 A. at 498.
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the flats, and of transporting it to other men’s lands and houses.”279 In
sum, the Maine Superior Court’s view that the term “navigation” has
evolved beyond its 1647 parameters seems born out in scholarly
writings, and by an extensive array of Maine case law.
Having made this essential point, the superior court acknowledges
that, “scuba diving and its associated uses did not exist when the Law
Court last dealt with interpretation of the term navigation . . . .”280 In
other words, there is no higher court opinion directly on point. The court
resolves this dilemma by reasoning:
[A] narrow reading of the term navigation, as encouraged by the
plaintiff, seeks to ignore the evolution and expansion of that term
by . . . the courts. A narrow reading of navigation would trap the
law to uses and related events associated with navigation as it
existed in the 1900’s and earlier . . . it does significant damage to
the evolution of the common law to reflect and react to the
development of our society.281
This reasoning led the court to conclude that scuba diving is a
permitted use in the intertidal zone, a further evolving of the public’s
navigational right.282 The amicus briefs, agreeing with the court’s logic
and result, would also reference the case of Butler v. Attorney General.283
This case states that: “among these [public rights] is, of course, the right
of navigation, with such incidental rights as pertain thereto. We think
that there is a right to swim or float in or upon public waters as well as to
sail upon them.”284 Butler clearly suggests that the public’s navigational
279. Andrews, 129 A. at 299.
280. McGarvey, WASHSC-CV-08-42 at 7.
281. Id. at 7-8.
282. Id. at 9.
283. 195 Mass. 79 (1907).
284. Id. at 84. The Butler court distinguished swimming and floating (holding these to
be permitted public uses) from bathing (holding it not to be a public use) probably on the
ground that the latter usually takes place in shallower intertidal water, or in the surf, and
often involves laying or being upon an exposed portion of beach below mean high for
extended periods of time. Whether this distinction as a practical matter, or in law, was
sound when Butler was decided, or is sound today, was not a matter the superior court
needed to reach or discuss. It did not comment on the Butler court’s distinction, but
make no mistake, Butler sustains the superior court’s conclusion.
On the point of whether the Butler distinction should be reexamined, it is
appropriate simply to note that the Butler distinction is thin indeed. It is certainly within
the Law Court’s prerogative to reexamine it. In doing so, the court ought to accept the
view that the same evolving of permitted uses or a “sympathetic generosity of
interpretation” of permitted uses that allowed the superior court, and hopefully the Law
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use right includes scuba diving, which involves swimming, floating,
moving about in intertidal waters. It seems clear that scuba diving is
correctly seen as a permitted, an “evolved,” and an “incidental public use
right.”
Finally, one must note that the Bell II holding, at least impliedly,
supports the superior court’s holding. Bell II states:
We have held that the public may fish, fowl, or navigate on the
privately owned land for pleasure as well as for business, or
sustenance, Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me at 449; and we have
in other ways given a sympathetically generous interpretation to
what is encompassed within the terms, “fishing,” “fowling,” and
“navigation,” or reasonably incidental or related thereto.285
Assuming the premise made at the outset of this argument that Bell II
remains the controlling law with respect to public and private rights in
the intertidal zone, it is irrelevant whether Bell II’s interpretation of
reserved public rights is more or less generous than some might like. It
is generous enough to affirm the superior court’s holding. An
affirmation by the Law Court of the lower court’s holding would be a
small but useful step in the right direction.
XIII. CONCLUSION
It is not possible, or particularly useful, to recapitulate arguments
carefully laid out in the nine separate issues. There are, however, several
underlying themes that bear repeating. To begin with, for nearly 2,000
years organized society has viewed the intertidal zone as a unique
space—a fragile area of transition between open ocean, not amenable to
private ownership, and littoral upland, which is, for the most part,
privately owned. Most nations, and states within our nation, have
retained a large degree of public ownership of, and a trusteeship with
respect to public uses in, these intertidal areas. Discrete parcels of
intertidal land have been alienated, often to facilitate commerce; this is
the exception, not the rule.
Second, the range of uses made of these intertidal areas over this
2,000 year period has varied widely and is constantly changing. The
drying of nets, erection of weirs, lateral passage along the foreshore are
almost non-existent today; recreational activities too numerous to
Court, to accept scuba diving as a logical extension of navigational use, would also
accept bathing as a similar logical extension of a permitted use.
285. See Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1989) (emphasis added).
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mention, surfboards, scuba diving, lawyers offices and condominiums on
refurbished piers—who could have imagined it when the Ordinance was
promulgated to facilitate commerce in a fledgling colonial setting. The
beauty of the common law is its ability to adjust to changing conditions
and new realities. The jus publicum has a similar vitality with respect to
defining and redefining public uses of intertidal land. The Bell decisions
lose this adaptability and the flexibility to adjust to the next round of
change. These decisions trap us in the past.
This factor alone, beyond the arguments raised in the issues
presented above, strongly suggests that the Bell cases were wrongly
decided. This view finds expression in the dissent in Bell II, the
concurring opinion in Eaton, and in Maine Superior Court decisions that
press Bell II to its limits, and often a small step beyond. The superior
court findings of fact in Muther barely temper the court’s incredulity
with the Bell cases. And finally, a growing range of scholarly writing
has critically reviewed these cases. None of this is likely to end unless
the Law Court reexamines these cases and modifies them in a way that
gives new vitality to the jus publicum—that enables the common law to
adjust and accommodate to new and changing conditions.
Finally, it must be noted that the Bell cases represent a paradigm
shift, a break with the past that is not in the best interest of large numbers
of Maine people. Prior to the Bell holdings, generations of Maine
people, including many littoral upland landowners, grew up honestly
believing that the public had a right to be upon intertidal land to walk,
swim, sit, fish, shoot duck, play with children and sand toys, toss a ball,
skim and ride boards on the very edge of the surf, put in a boat, a kayak,
a surfboard, or just watch the water, the waves, the changing colors of
the sea and sky. No one thought to interdict these pleasures; few thought
it was possible to interdict them.
The Bell cases ended that long bucolic era of sharing public and
private use rights in the intertidal zone. What has emerged is a growing
private property rights zealotry, and counsel equal to the task, ready to
press each case. One of the parties in the cases now before the Law
Court uses the phrase “appellant’s beach” repeatedly, as if he created it,
or earned it, rather than being the fortuitous beneficiary of random
events. Littoral upland owners today talk openly of exclusion, keeping
people out, limiting the range of permitted public uses in the intertidal
zone. The larger public has had to adjust to these new realities; there is a
growing range of places they cannot go, and a growing range of
pleasurable activities that cannot be permissibly engaged in. One is
constantly aware today that one may be asked to move along. Like the
shrinking of Maine’s northern forests, and the increased posting of lands
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throughout the state, accessible foreshore is less and less open to the
public; it is becoming an enclave of the wealthy.
All of this derives from the Bell cases. This paradigm shift is
unwarranted; it’s bad for Maine’s people and our economy. More
importantly, Maine’s people and Legislature have never alienated the
vast majority of our intertidal lands. We never, with our own statehood
in hand, examined the implications of the Ordinance. We never grasped
the full meaning of the equal-footing doctrine. We simply acquiesced.
The court in Lapish, told us it was no longer “an open question,” and we
believed it. 286 The Bell cases repeat this theme. They would confine us
to a history Massachusetts created for us—a history we did not create for
ourselves. Phillips Petroleum says it’s not too late; 171 years of error can
be undone.
In short, public and private sharing of Maine’s intertidal lands can,
and must be revived. We cannot be locked into an ambiguous 360-year
old Ordinance, and be held captive by Massachusetts law. Maine can
and must develop its own intertidal land law. Private property rights
count, but the public interest of an entire state counts for more. The Law
Court should correct the errors of our past—to fashion a robust jus
publicum—to recognize that the tidelands in truth, and in law, belong to
the people of Maine.

286. Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85, 93 (1831).

